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COVID-19 and Privacy | |
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< | -- By ElaineHuang - 20 Nov 2020 | >
> | -- By ElaineHuang - 31 Dec 2020 | | |
Introduction | |
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< | South Korea has had, in general, an effective response to the pandemic. With the recent spike in cases, the total number of confirmed cases is a little over 30,000. Especially when compared to the United States, even accounting for the U.S.’s larger population, South Korea is one of the countries that has handled the pandemic particularly well. | >
> | In May of this year, there was an outbreak of COVID-19 in the Itaewon district of Seoul tied to a string of nightclubs there. The Seoul Metropolitan Government quickly traced anyone who had visited one of the major nightclubs by using data from credit card records, lists of nightclub visitors, public transportation records, and surveillance cameras to eventually identify 5,517 people. They also used cell phone location data to identify another 60,000 people who had spent at least half an hour around the area. With this data, the South Korean government monitored these people and had them get tested. | | | | |
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< | For a case in point, in May of this year, there was a small outbreak of Coronavirus in the Itaewon district of Seoul, tied to a string of nightclubs in the area. The Seoul Metropolitan Government quickly traced anyone who had visited one of the major nightclubs and also used data from cell phones, credit card records, lists of nightclub visitors, public transportation records, and surveillance cameras to eventually identify 5,517 people. They also used cell phone location data to identify close to another 60,000 people who had spent at least half an hour around the area. With this data, the South Korean government was able to monitor these people, have them get tested anonymously, and slow the spread of the virus. | >
> | This sort of digital contact tracing is not unique to South Korea, as we have seen countries like Singapore, Israel, and China, amongst others, implement similar strategies in an attempt to identify those who have potentially been infected. The extent to which these governments are able to use data, and the lack of safeguards against the data being used for other surveillance purposes after the pandemic, is alarming. But is this digital surveillance even effective enough against COVID-19 to warrant less privacy? | | | | |
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< | While stopping the spread of the virus is not something to criticize, I was alarmed by the extent to which the government was able to use data to identify these individuals. And this led me to wonder about the role of privacy during a pandemic. Should people have a lower expectation of privacy? | >
> | Data and Privacy
Efficacy of Digital Contact Tracing | | | | |
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< | Anonymity and Privacy Problems During a Pandemic | >
> | Traditionally, the spread of a disease was tracked by trained interviewers who collected a list of people who have been in contact with the infected interviewee and then informed those individuals and observed them for symptoms. Researchers at Oxford have argued that the virus spreads way too quickly for traditional methods to be used and suggested that digital contact tracing is more reliable, assuming that all of those contacts will be quarantined. However, as Natalie Ram and David Gray point out, this assumption that everyone who has potentially been infected will quarantine for at least a two-week period is a generous one (Natalie Ram & David Gray, Mass Surveillance in the Age of COVID-19, 7 J.L. & the Biosciences 1, 12 (2020)). Digital contact tracing can only be beneficial if we have the capacity to provide COVID-19 testing to all of those identified and the confidence that they will self-isolate. | | | | |
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< | Tracking the spread of a pandemic is extremely important in curbing the rate of infection. Indeed, when I visited different offices during the course of my summer internship, all of the places asked me to write down my name and contact information, which I gladly complied to because had that office later discovered a positive COVID case, I would have liked to know about my potential exposure and get tested. Tracking allows for people to isolate sooner, thereby reducing the risk of exposure to those around them. | >
> | In addition, current technology might not even be able to reliably find potentially infected individuals. We have been told to stay at least six feet away from others. GPS location data has a margin of error wider than six feet, cell phone data is even less precise, and Bluetooth data might say that two people separated by a wall or who are on different floors might be in close proximity to each other. | | | | |
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< | In this Korean nightclub case, however, the tracking was much more invasive than simply asking for a name and contact information. As stated by Professor Moglen previously, anonymity is more than just hiding away one particular thing we do–it’s also about what we read, what we see, what our preferences are. These nightclubs were frequented by the LGBTQ+ community, which is still quite stigmatized in South Korean society, and while the government offered anonymous testing to encourage this community to get tested–only requesting a phone number for contact purposes–the data from cell phones, credit cards, public transportation records, and cameras still outed the people who visited Itaewon and exposed their preferences (e.g. their preference for nightclubs, choice of drink, post-clubbing snacks, or even for other people). Even if this data didn’t include names per se, the aggregate of all of the information may still have allowed the government to personally identify individuals. | >
> | In Singapore, about 12% of the population downloaded an app that uses Bluetooth to track contact, and according to the Verge, should a similar proportion of the U.S. download a similar app, the probability of getting notified of possible infection by passing someone else with the app is only 1.44%. While this could be improved by encouraging more people to download the app, it seems like an awkward solution considering the severity of the pandemic, along with the aforementioned problem with Bluetooth technology. In addition, over-identifying infected individuals may lead to less confidence in the system and lesser compliance. Instead, traditional methods may lead to more accurate notifications of people who might have been in close contact, encouraging a greater percentage of those people to get tested and self-isolate (Id. at 13). | | | | |
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< | The collection of such data is much more invasive than simply writing down a name and contact information, but perhaps it was more effective than the latter. In the face of a pandemic, and judging from the positive response to the government’s swift action, it doesn’t seem like people even minded that their anonymity and privacy were being stripped away. | >
> | Anonymity and Privacy Problems During a Pandemic
As stated by Professor Moglen previously, anonymity is more than just hiding away one particular thing we do—it is also about what we read, what we see, and what our preferences are. The Korean nightclubs were frequented by the LGBTQ+ community, which is still stigmatized in South Korea, and while the government offered anonymous testing to encourage them to get tested, the data from cell phones, credit cards, public transportation records, and cameras still outed the people who visited Itaewon and exposed their preferences (e.g. their preference for other people). Even if this data didn’t include names per se, the aggregate of all of the information may still have allowed the government to personally identify individuals. | | | | |
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< | What Can Be Done?
One thing that should be done is to allow people to request to have their data permanently deleted once the pandemic is over. Even better is to require these agencies and companies to delete this data without customer requests. | >
> | The collection of such data is much more invasive than simply writing down a name and contact information, and perhaps the supposed benefits of such privacy invasion are not that much greater than that of the traditional method. It is difficult to look at the relative success in South Korea or elsewhere as the direct result of using surveillance data. Other variables, such as the willingness of people wearing masks, effective government response, and voluntary self-isolation, have definitely contributed to faster containment. In the United States, the official response was slow; there was a shortage of masks, especially for the health care workers; and even now, many people refuse to wear masks and self-isolate. It is premature to declare that digital surveillance has positively caused a slowdown of spread without looking at the data and the effects of these other variables on the outcome. Even if it is effective, there is little to prove that measures with lesser privacy concerns, such as the traditional method, would not be just as, or even more, effective. | | | | |
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< | And, if there is no better way to track the spread of a pandemic, people should at the very least be aware of their consent to credit card companies or cell phone providers to provide this information to the Government in times of a viral outbreak.
Another option is to simply have the proper infrastructure in place for people to get tested frequently and anonymously without personally identifiable information. South Korea had the right idea when it promised anonymous testing to encourage the LGBTQ+ community to get tested. | | | | |
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> | What Can Be Done? | | | | |
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This is a good start in clarifying the issues, I think. We need to know what actually works, however. Recent South Korean experience has shown how rapidly the virus can jump past the point at which tracing single clusters is feasible. Much of the argument depends on whether there is any actual ability to prevent cases and to save lives by conducting mass surveillance or repurposing surveillance-capable data sources in this fashion. The discussion has not occurred in the US because the scale of the outbreak dwarfs any such efforts, It would much improve the draft to put the Korean efforts in context. What have we actually learned in the world about the value or absence of value of such efforts? If they are pointless, then discussing whether they are necessary is a category error.
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> | Rather than spending resources on developing the technology to track COVID-19, the United States should instead focus on building up its public health infrastructure. Since the beginning of the pandemic, hospitals have been at over-capacity, while nurses and doctors lacked appropriate PPE. There has also been a shortage of reliable COVID-19 tests available for those who are concerned about their exposure, and even then, the cost of taking a test may dissuade those who should get tested. | | | | |
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> | In terms of tracing the virus, the slower traditional method of contact tracing may lead to better results in the long run. Training and hiring more of those workers may be a better use of resources. So, before rushing to build digital contact tracing, we should seriously consider whether it provides that much more benefit in relation to its invasion of our privacy. | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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