ElliottPaper1 23 - 31 Dec 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | LexisNexis and Westlaw share duopolistic control of the U.S. market for legal information. Lexis/Westlaw's stranglehold on legal information is founded on the unfortunate circumstance that American law is not freely and publicly available. U.S. courts charge 8 cents per page. Some state courts offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. Statutes and regulatory orders are generally available online, but even these sources are relatively difficult to access, and they lack the metadata offered by Lexis/Westlaw. To varying degrees, then, the law is virtually proprietized, sold at a profit by Lexis/Westlaw. | |
< < | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability. | > > | As democratic theory and traditional copyright theory would have it, Lexis/Westlaw don't own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability. This is true of federal publications, but legal documents by individual American states can be copyrighted. Massive libraries of these documents are proprietized and sold for profit by Reuters, West;aw’s corporate owner. Attempts by congress to address this offense to democracy have died in committee. | | | |
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- Not of course. This is true of federal publications. But state legal publications can be copyrighted. Thomson/West/Reuters' predecessor in interest, West Publishing Company, was the proprietary publisher of state reports from the 1880s, which is how the company built its fortune.
- -- JohnPowerHely - There have been some halfhearted attempts to fix this. See H. R. 1584, 104th Congress. In the past 56 years only this and a companion bill have been proposed, and neither made it out of committee.
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> > | <-- END twistyPlugin--> | | The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business.
The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information imposes grave social costs. From the standpoint of political theory, American citizens do not have public access to the laws that are supposed to be influencing their behavior and for which violation could mean punishment by the state. The costs of civil litigation are distorted upward, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. When a wide income gap separates the parties to a dispute, the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Most ironically, courts must pay Lexis/Westlaw for access to the fruits of their own labor--and the American taxpayer foots the bill. | |
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| | For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, and the resultant efficiency surplus cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax.
- This assumes a degree of difficulty in learning how to perform searches that could only be itself the result of ignorance. It is easier to learn enough about databases to make learning to search productively with either (or with something else) largely transferrable.
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- There are too many reasons for this sort of design to accept this analysis on faith, and you give no reason to believe that these are causal relations. It is true that making a generic user interface is not in either's interest, but the real point is that neither has an incentive to get rid of web interfaces altogether in favor of a semantic web approach that would be superior for all users.
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> > | <-- END twistyPlugin--> | | The Role of the Law School
During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on Lexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task. | |
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- Requiring use of proprietary services to deliver education is an objectionable practice. We should have discussed this with the instructor.
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> > | <-- END twistyPlugin--> | | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platforms. By purchasing Lexis/Westlaw access for students and faculty--as well as participating in the aforementioned habituation schemes--Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduates' platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them. | | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the decentralized database for search purposes. The decentralized Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchistically via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | |
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- You are trying to invent the semantic web. You won't do better than all the people working on it have already done, and the lawyers won't need more than the others working with much larger problems need.
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> > | <-- END twistyPlugin--> | | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and locating legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the platform's search interface. Reporter paginations--an obsolete relic from the old library days--can be phased out in favor of paragraph numbers. | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed. | |
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- First, will allowing American citizens--many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law--to view caselaw freely solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion. -- JoshS
- Why are you pretty sure, Josh? Could you help us be pretty
| | *-- JohnPowerHely - Daniel - I'd agree that The Public shouldn't be able to change the text of opinions, but just as WestLaw? has KeyCites? and Lexis has Headnotes (or is it Header Notes?), an open source wiki version could have its own case notes and synopses.
- Elliot - "non-functional digital goods (like legal information) are superiorly distributed anarchistically" - legal information is a non-functional good more akin to music than coding? I'm not saying you're wrong or right, but I'm still a little shocked (and kinda wondering why we are all putting in so much time and money here at CLS if that is the case). | |
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- I don’t advocate that the text of legal documents should be wiki-ized – the metadata, like headnotes and linking between cases and categorizations, etc, should be wiki-ized. And, John, I think you are confusing the role of law school education. We aren’t learning legal documents (which are digital information), we are learning reasoning skills, etc. (which are not). I think in an ideal world, the law is something like computer code, and in some areas of law this is truer than others. But in the end political gamesmanship is going to dominate the efficiency/effectiveness goals that would be furthered by treating law as a functional digital good.
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ElliottPaper1 22 - 11 Dec 2008 - Main.JoshS
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed. | |
< < |
- First, will allowing American citizens--many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law--to view caselaw freely solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion.
| > > |
- First, will allowing American citizens--many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law--to view caselaw freely solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion. -- JoshS
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< < |
- Why are you pretty sure, JoshS? ? Could you help us be pretty
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- Why are you pretty sure, Josh? Could you help us be pretty
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- Some think that wikis would be well-used for, say, treatises. I think there's not much value in putting all our caselaw in wikis--a special-purpose annotator might be better, because there shouldn't be any reason for The Public to go around changing the text of opinions. -- DanielHarris - 15 Nov 2008
*-- JohnPowerHely - Daniel - I'd agree that The Public shouldn't be able to change the text of opinions, but just as WestLaw? has KeyCites? and Lexis has Headnotes (or is it Header Notes?), an open source wiki version could have its own case notes and synopses. |
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ElliottPaper1 21 - 10 Dec 2008 - Main.JohnPowerHely
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability.
- Not of course. This is true of federal publications. But state legalpublications can be copyrighted. Thomson/West/Reuters' predecessor in interest, West Publishing Company, was the proprietary publisher of state reports from the 1880s, which is how the company built its fortune.
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> > |
- -- JohnPowerHely - There have been some halfhearted attempts to fix this. See H. R. 1584, 104th Congress. In the past 56 years only this and a companion bill have been proposed, and neither made it out of committee.
| | The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business. | |
- This assumes a degree of difficulty in learning how to perform searches that could only be itself the result of ignorance. It is easier to learn enough about databases to make learning to search productively with either (or with something else) largely transferrable.
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> > |
- -- JohnPowerHely - What of the fact that the two platforms are not completely equivalent in terms of database coverage? I would be interested in seeing some data on whether or not the difference in coverage of briefs and secondary legal materials has an effect on legal scholarship, and if individuals who are more proficient with one than the other will cite to sources from that product.
| | Neither Lexis/Westlaw offers an optional modification mimicking the other platform's interface, implying collusion. In the event of collusion, Lexis/Westlaw are incentivized to arbitrarily differentiate their platforms' interfaces. If the platforms had identical (or interchangeable) interfaces, habituated users could costlessly swap platforms, precluding the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. Relatedly, Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at Lexis/Westlaw's cluttered interfaces (Cf. Precydent's 's parsimonious appearance). | | sure too?
- Some think that wikis would be well-used for, say, treatises. I think there's not much value in putting all our caselaw in wikis--a special-purpose annotator might be better, because there shouldn't be any reason for The Public to go around changing the text of opinions. -- DanielHarris - 15 Nov 2008
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> > | *-- JohnPowerHely - Daniel - I'd agree that The Public shouldn't be able to change the text of opinions, but just as WestLaw? has KeyCites? and Lexis has Headnotes (or is it Header Notes?), an open source wiki version could have its own case notes and synopses.
- Elliot - "non-functional digital goods (like legal information) are superiorly distributed anarchistically" - legal information is a non-functional good more akin to music than coding? I'm not saying you're wrong or right, but I'm still a little shocked (and kinda wondering why we are all putting in so much time and money here at CLS if that is the case). |
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ElliottPaper1 20 - 15 Nov 2008 - Main.DanielHarris
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | |
- Why are you pretty sure, JoshS? ? Could you help us be pretty sure too?
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- Some think that wikis would be well-used for, say, treatises. I think there's not much value in putting all our caselaw in wikis--a special-purpose annotator might be better, because there shouldn't be any reason for The Public to go around changing the text of opinions. -- DanielHarris - 15 Nov 2008
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ElliottPaper1 19 - 15 Nov 2008 - Main.EbenMoglen
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | LexisNexis and Westlaw share duopolistic control of the U.S. market for legal information. Lexis/Westlaw's stranglehold on legal information is founded on the unfortunate circumstance that American law is not freely and publicly available. U.S. courts charge 8 cents per page. Some state courts offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. Statutes and regulatory orders are generally available online, but even these sources are relatively difficult to access, and they lack the metadata offered by Lexis/Westlaw. To varying degrees, then, the law is virtually proprietized, sold at a profit by Lexis/Westlaw. | |
< < | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability. The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business. | > > | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability.
- Not of course. This is true of federal publications. But state legalpublications can be copyrighted. Thomson/West/Reuters' predecessor in interest, West Publishing Company, was the proprietary publisher of state reports from the 1880s, which is how the company built its fortune.
The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business. | | The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information imposes grave social costs. From the standpoint of political theory, American citizens do not have public access to the laws that are supposed to be influencing their behavior and for which violation could mean punishment by the state. The costs of civil litigation are distorted upward, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. When a wide income gap separates the parties to a dispute, the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Most ironically, courts must pay Lexis/Westlaw for access to the fruits of their own labor--and the American taxpayer foots the bill.
For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, and the resultant efficiency surplus cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. | |
> > |
- This assumes a degree of difficulty in learning how to perform searches that could only be itself the result of ignorance. It is easier to learn enough about databases to make learning to search productively with either (or with something else) largely transferrable.
| | Neither Lexis/Westlaw offers an optional modification mimicking the other platform's interface, implying collusion. In the event of collusion, Lexis/Westlaw are incentivized to arbitrarily differentiate their platforms' interfaces. If the platforms had identical (or interchangeable) interfaces, habituated users could costlessly swap platforms, precluding the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. Relatedly, Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at Lexis/Westlaw's cluttered interfaces (Cf. Precydent's 's parsimonious appearance). | |
> > |
- There are too many reasons for this sort of design to accept this analysis on faith, and you give no reason to believe that these are causal relations. It is true that making a generic user interface is not in either's interest, but the real point is that neither has an incentive to get rid of web interfaces altogether in favor of a semantic web approach that would be superior for all users.
| | The Role of the Law School
During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on Lexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task. | |
> > |
- Requiring use of proprietary services to deliver education is an objectionable practice. We should have discussed this with the instructor.
| | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platforms. By purchasing Lexis/Westlaw access for students and faculty--as well as participating in the aforementioned habituation schemes--Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduates' platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them.
The Free Alternative | | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the decentralized database for search purposes. The decentralized Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchistically via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | |
> > |
- You are trying to invent the semantic web. You won't do better than all the people working on it have already done, and the lawyers won't need more than the others working with much larger problems need.
| | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and locating legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the platform's search interface. Reporter paginations--an obsolete relic from the old library days--can be phased out in favor of paragraph numbers.
Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchistically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface mods mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed.
- First, will allowing American citizens--many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law--to view caselaw freely solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion.
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- Why are you pretty sure, JoshS? ? Could you help us be pretty sure too?
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ElliottPaper1 18 - 11 Nov 2008 - Main.JoshS
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed. | |
< < |
- First, as I'm sure you know, many American statutes have been made available by the relevant legislative authorities, which means I take your argument to be primarily concerned with the unavailability of caselaw. If that's true, will allowing American citizens, many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law, to freely view caselaw solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion.
| > > |
- First, will allowing American citizens--many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law--to view caselaw freely solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion.
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ElliottPaper1 17 - 10 Nov 2008 - Main.JoshS
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, costs would be most efficiently internalized were the project government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which being Lexis/Westlaw's substantial lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. For financial context, it bears noting that the founders of FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute for $7 million. The top ten (or fifty) law schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to transfer their documents en masse into the free platform's database. This latter route might be more feasible than one would expect; while the free platform would likely put all three companies out of business, the search company that sells first will get out with some profit.
The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed.
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> > |
- First, as I'm sure you know, many American statutes have been made available by the relevant legislative authorities, which means I take your argument to be primarily concerned with the unavailability of caselaw. If that's true, will allowing American citizens, many of whom assume that statutes are the entirety of what makes up the law, to freely view caselaw solve the problem of being influenced and controlled by laws they don't have access/understanding of? On the other hand, Wikipedia has entries for some cases where the cases are (minimally) synthesized. If your concern is about getting the citizenry information about what cases are out there, is that equally helpful? Differently helpful? Second, I'm pretty sure that Lexis and WestLaw? are forced to have non-mimicking platforms because they keep suing each other for (what they perceive as) copyright violations, not because of collusion.
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ElliottPaper1 15 - 08 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research
The Political Economy of Legal Research | |
< < | LexisNexis and Westlaw share duopolistic control of the U.S. market for legal information. Lexis/Westlaw's stranglehold on legal information is founded on the unfortunate circumstance that American law is not freely and publicly available. U.S. courts charge 8 cents per page. Some state courts offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. Statutes and regulatory orders are generally available online, but even these sources are relatively difficult to access, and they do not have the meta-operability offered by Lexis/Westlaw. To varying degrees, then, the law is virtually proprietized, sold at a profit by Lexis/Westlaw. | > > | LexisNexis and Westlaw share duopolistic control of the U.S. market for legal information. Lexis/Westlaw's stranglehold on legal information is founded on the unfortunate circumstance that American law is not freely and publicly available. U.S. courts charge 8 cents per page. Some state courts offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. Statutes and regulatory orders are generally available online, but even these sources are relatively difficult to access, and they lack the metadata offered by Lexis/Westlaw. To varying degrees, then, the law is virtually proprietized, sold at a profit by Lexis/Westlaw. | | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability. The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business. | | For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, and the resultant efficiency surplus cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. | |
< < | Neither Lexis/Westlaw offers an optional modification mimicking the other platform's interface, implying collusion. In the event of collusion, Lexis/Westlaw are incentivized to arbitrarily differentiate their platforms' interfaces. If the platforms had identical (or interchangeable) interfaces, habituated users could costlessly swap platforms, precluding the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. Relatedly, Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at Lexis/Westlaw's cluttered interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). | > > | Neither Lexis/Westlaw offers an optional modification mimicking the other platform's interface, implying collusion. In the event of collusion, Lexis/Westlaw are incentivized to arbitrarily differentiate their platforms' interfaces. If the platforms had identical (or interchangeable) interfaces, habituated users could costlessly swap platforms, precluding the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. Relatedly, Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at Lexis/Westlaw's cluttered interfaces (Cf. Precydent's 's parsimonious appearance). | | The Role of the Law School | | The Free Alternative | |
< < | The defining feature of online legal research is that database software and legal information are digital, infinitely replicable and distributable at near-zero marginal cost. As Eben Moglen's theory predicts and history has shown, functional digital goods (like database software) are superiorly produced anarchistically, while non-functional digital goods (like legal information) are superiorly distributed anarchistically. These insights imply a framework for a superior alternative to Lexis/Westlaw's proprietary legal-research platforms: a free and open-source legal-research platform on the scale of Lexis/Westlaw, operating on an anarchistically developed search engine, distributing information via anarchistic peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, and integrating metadata composed anarchistically by the legal community. | > > | The defining feature of online legal research is that database software and legal information are digital, infinitely replicable and distributable at near-zero marginal cost. As Eben Moglen's theory predicts and history has shown, functional digital goods (like databases and search engines) are superiorly produced anarchistically, while non-functional digital goods (like legal information) are superiorly distributed anarchistically. These insights imply a framework for a serious free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw's proprietary legal-research platforms: a free and open-source legal-research platform on the scale of Lexis/Westlaw, operating on an anarchistically developed search engine, distributing information via anarchistic peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, and composing metadata anarchistically through a public wiki. | | | |
< < | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the database enabling searches of the database. A centralized catalog does not require a single centralized server for all information, but rather enables the opposite. Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchistically via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | > > | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the decentralized database for search purposes. The decentralized Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchistically via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | | | |
< < | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and locating legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the platform's search interface. | > > | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and locating legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the platform's search interface. Reporter paginations--an obsolete relic from the old library days--can be phased out in favor of paragraph numbers. | | | |
< < | Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchistically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface packages mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular, because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | > > | Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchistically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface mods mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | | Meanwhile, the metadata linking legal documents (but not the documents themselves) will be publicly editable by the legal community through a document annotations wiki. This project will be undertaken anarchistically, with gradually greater structure and restrictions built in as existing materials are exhaustively annotated. _Nature_'s finding that Wikipedia is just as reliable as the Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that the free legal-research platform could plausibly be as reliable as Lexis/Westlaw. With so many smart people using the database, abuses and manipulations can be cleared up quickly and the perpetrators exiled. In the long run, it is probable that the free platform would become superior to Lexis/Westlaw in usefulness and usability. | |
< < | Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, it would be ideal if the project was government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which is Lexis/Westlaw's lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. For financial context, it bears noting that the founders of FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute for $7 million. The top ten (or fifty) law schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to transfer their documents en masse into the free platform's database. This latter route might be more feasible than one would expect; while the free platform would likely put all three companies out of business, the search company that sells first will get out with some profit. | > > | Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, costs would be most efficiently internalized were the project government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which being Lexis/Westlaw's substantial lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. For financial context, it bears noting that the founders of FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute for $7 million. The top ten (or fifty) law schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to transfer their documents en masse into the free platform's database. This latter route might be more feasible than one would expect; while the free platform would likely put all three companies out of business, the search company that sells first will get out with some profit. | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed. |
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ElliottPaper1 14 - 08 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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< < | The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | > > | The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | | The Political Economy of Legal Research | | The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information imposes grave social costs. From the standpoint of political theory, American citizens do not have public access to the laws that are supposed to be influencing their behavior and for which violation could mean punishment by the state. The costs of civil litigation are distorted upward, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. When a wide income gap separates the parties to a dispute, the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Most ironically, courts must pay Lexis/Westlaw for access to the fruits of their own labor--and the American taxpayer foots the bill. | |
< < | For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. With attorney wages what they are, a 10 or 20 percent cut in research efficiency will deter most from moving to a different platform. The platform-specific investment also discourages users of the existing platforms from investing in free alternatives. | > > | For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, and the resultant efficiency surplus cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. | | | |
< < | A side effect of the duopoly model is that Lexis and Westlaw share an incentive to differentiate their platforms. If they had identical interfaces, then habituated users could costlessly change systems, and market competition would preclude the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. | > > | Neither Lexis/Westlaw offers an optional modification mimicking the other platform's interface, implying collusion. In the event of collusion, Lexis/Westlaw are incentivized to arbitrarily differentiate their platforms' interfaces. If the platforms had identical (or interchangeable) interfaces, habituated users could costlessly swap platforms, precluding the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. Relatedly, Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at Lexis/Westlaw's cluttered interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). | | | |
< < | A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoils of clutter that suffice as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book," in which managers are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase new editions. | > > | The Role of the Law School | | | |
< < | --+++ Columbia's Complicity | > > | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on Lexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task. | | | |
< < | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on Lexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial.
The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them. Meanwhile, Columbia pairs this indirect subsidy with payment for academic use of the services. | > > | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platforms. By purchasing Lexis/Westlaw access for students and faculty--as well as participating in the aforementioned habituation schemes--Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduates' platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them. | | The Free Alternative | |
< < | The defining feature of the contemporary legal-research market is that its product, legal information, is a zero-marginal-cost digital good. Digital goods are characterized by two unique properties, according to Eben Moglen: 1) functional digital goods are most efficiently produced anarchically, while 2) non-functional digital goods are most efficiently distributed anarchically. Whether legal information is functional or non-functional--and whether "functional" and "non-functional" are coherent and mutually exclusive categories--is an interesting question for a later day. In the present context, though, it is a reasonable expectation that both properties would be extant for legal information. | > > | The defining feature of online legal research is that database software and legal information are digital, infinitely replicable and distributable at near-zero marginal cost. As Eben Moglen's theory predicts and history has shown, functional digital goods (like database software) are superiorly produced anarchistically, while non-functional digital goods (like legal information) are superiorly distributed anarchistically. These insights imply a framework for a superior alternative to Lexis/Westlaw's proprietary legal-research platforms: a free and open-source legal-research platform on the scale of Lexis/Westlaw, operating on an anarchistically developed search engine, distributing information via anarchistic peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, and integrating metadata composed anarchistically by the legal community. | | | |
< < | The practical implication is the deproprietization of all legal information, its | > > | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the database enabling searches of the database. A centralized catalog does not require a single centralized server for all information, but rather enables the opposite. Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchistically via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | | | |
< < | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, it would be ideal if the project was government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which is Lexis/Westlaw's lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. The people behind FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute $7 million. The top ten Ivy League schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to release documents into the public domain. This might be more feasible than one would expect, because whoever does it first will make some money while remaining players will be out of business. | > > | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and locating legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the platform's search interface. | | | |
< < | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the database enabling searches of the database. A centralized catalog does not require a single centralized server for all information, but rather enables the opposite. Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchically via all the world's networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | > > | Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchistically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface packages mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular, because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | | | |
< < | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and finding legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the free platform's search interface. | > > | Meanwhile, the metadata linking legal documents (but not the documents themselves) will be publicly editable by the legal community through a document annotations wiki. This project will be undertaken anarchistically, with gradually greater structure and restrictions built in as existing materials are exhaustively annotated. _Nature_'s finding that Wikipedia is just as reliable as the Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that the free legal-research platform could plausibly be as reliable as Lexis/Westlaw. With so many smart people using the database, abuses and manipulations can be cleared up quickly and the perpetrators exiled. In the long run, it is probable that the free platform would become superior to Lexis/Westlaw in usefulness and usability. | | | |
< < | Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface packages mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular, because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | > > | Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, it would be ideal if the project was government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which is Lexis/Westlaw's lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. For financial context, it bears noting that the founders of FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute for $7 million. The top ten (or fifty) law schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to transfer their documents en masse into the free platform's database. This latter route might be more feasible than one would expect; while the free platform would likely put all three companies out of business, the search company that sells first will get out with some profit. | | | |
< < | Meanwhile, the meta-information linking legal materials will be continuously updated by law professors and their students. This will initially be an anarchical project, with gradually greater structure and restrictions built in as existing materials are exhaustively annotated. _Nature_'s finding that Wikipedia is just as reliable as the Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that the free legal-research platform can be as reliable as Lexis/Westlaw. With so many smart people using the database, abuses and manipulations can be cleared up quickly and the perpetrators exiled. In the long run, it is inevitable that the free platform would become superior to Lexis/Westlaw in both usefulness and usability. | > > | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. The free alternative described above should be pursued with all deliberate speed. |
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ElliottPaper1 13 - 08 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research
The Political Economy of Legal Research | |
< < | Lexis and Westlaw share duopolistic dominance of the United States' market for legal information. The corrupt circumstance enabling the existence of the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly is that the law isn't free. Despite so-called fundamental precepts of The U.S. judiciary's online record system, PACER, charges [[http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html#GP8][8 cents] per page revealed in a search. State courts might offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. What is freely available online does not have the meta-operability that makes Lexis/Westlaw materials far more valuable. The rest of the cases--what isn't freely available--might still be law (enforced by state violence), but it is constructively proprietary information, hoarded and sold by Lexis/Westlaw. | > > | LexisNexis and Westlaw share duopolistic control of the U.S. market for legal information. Lexis/Westlaw's stranglehold on legal information is founded on the unfortunate circumstance that American law is not freely and publicly available. U.S. courts charge 8 cents per page. Some state courts offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. Statutes and regulatory orders are generally available online, but even these sources are relatively difficult to access, and they do not have the meta-operability offered by Lexis/Westlaw. To varying degrees, then, the law is virtually proprietized, sold at a profit by Lexis/Westlaw. | | | |
< < | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't "own" the law. Statutes, regulations, and cases are produced by agents of the people's government--they are public property, regardless of public availability. The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of a massive database is infinitely cheaper than scouring physical records at a courthouse, legislature, or library. | > > | Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't legally own the law. Statutes, regulations, and opinions are produced by agents of the democratic government and enter immediately into the public domain, regardless of public availability. The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of an online database is infinitely cheaper than scouring filing cabinets at a courthouse or library. The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly does not face a serious rival entrant because the costs of building a minimally comparable database from scratch present a prohibitive barrier to entry. At the same time, digital databases operate at increasing returns to scale, so the existing incumbents can easily underprice rival entrants and put them out of business. | | | |
< < | It is difficult to overestimate the social costs imposed by the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information. It distorts the costs of civil litigation, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. This distortion is amplified when a wide income separate the parties, where the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Criminal defense attorneys with inadequate resources cannot mount satisfactory defenses. | > > | The Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information imposes grave social costs. From the standpoint of political theory, American citizens do not have public access to the laws that are supposed to be influencing their behavior and for which violation could mean punishment by the state. The costs of civil litigation are distorted upward, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. When a wide income gap separates the parties to a dispute, the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Most ironically, courts must pay Lexis/Westlaw for access to the fruits of their own labor--and the American taxpayer foots the bill. | | | |
< < | The use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital. By using a particular platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. With attorney wages what they are, a 10 or 20 percent cut in research efficiency will deter most from moving to a different platform. The platform-specific investment also discourages users of the existing platforms from | > > | For the individual researcher, the use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital (analogous to firm-specific human capital). By using a particular research platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. With attorney wages what they are, a 10 or 20 percent cut in research efficiency will deter most from moving to a different platform. The platform-specific investment also discourages users of the existing platforms from investing in free alternatives. | | A side effect of the duopoly model is that Lexis and Westlaw share an incentive to differentiate their platforms. If they had identical interfaces, then habituated users could costlessly change systems, and market competition would preclude the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw.
A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoils of clutter that suffice as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book," in which managers are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase new editions. | |
< < | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent Elsevier, meanwhile, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress.
| | --+++ Columbia's Complicity | |
< < | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | > > | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on Lexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them. Meanwhile, Columbia pairs this indirect subsidy with payment for academic use of the services. | | The practical implication is the deproprietization of all legal information, its | |
< < | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. A free legal research platform might consist of a public database of legal materials maintained by the nation's largest law schools. The meta-information linking cases will be a continual project undertaken by law professors and their students.
The people behind FastCase estimate that scanning and transcribing every federal and state case and statute will cost them $6 million. Apart from the unionized-labor complication, the top ten Ivy League schools could easily fund a similar open-source effort.
Law journals should be the first organizations to sign onto the free-law effort. Since they are locked in libraries and . On the one hand, this circumstance protects them from being widely read and thereby condemned for incompetence. But, as demonstrated in Chris Anderson's The Long Tail, there is demand, however small, for a virtually infinite range of creative and functional content (pg. ). By unlocking the storage and meta-connection of law journal articles, the free-law effort would facilitate the synthesis of wider blocks of information and argument.
An alternative to a centralized free-law resource would be instead a uniform system of citation, pagination, and meta-data standards for legal materials that could be implemented on a wide range of information-hosting platforms.
A free legal wiki would separate content from presentation, allowing users and groups to customize the presentation of information to meet particular goals and circumstances. The free platform can parrot the presentation systems of Lexis and Westlaw, allowing previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific capital without paying the monopoly rents exacted by proprietary systems.
A not insignificant objection to this is that, as a product of unpaid altruists, it would not be as reliable as Lexis/WestLaw. This is possible, but at the very least it will be a decent alternative for those who cannot afford or who are politically opposed to Lexis/Westlaw. Besides, the science journal Nature found that the facts presented in Wikipedia are just as reliable as those written in Encyclopedia Britannica. | > > | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. Because the benefits of such a free platform would be widely distributed across society, it would be ideal if the project was government-funded. But such a course of action faces serious obstacles, not least of which is Lexis/Westlaw's lobbying efforts. It would be more feasible, I think, to establish the free legal-research database as an independent nonprofit in the tradition of Wikipedia. Funding would be provided mainly by leading law schools, supplemented by donations from cooperative law firms. The people behind FastCase scanned and transcribed every federal and state case and statute $7 million. The top ten Ivy League schools could easily fund a similar public-domain effort. Alternatively, the law-school coalition could pay Lexis/Westlaw/FastCase to release documents into the public domain. This might be more feasible than one would expect, because whoever does it first will make some money while remaining players will be out of business. | | | |
< < | Another objection to the free platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. Wikipedia, again, is a testament to the growth of internal safeguards against abuses. | > > | The free legal-research platform requires two centralized structural components: 1) a central catalog , and 2) a uniform citation protocol. The catalog will be a centralized record of every document in the database enabling searches of the database. A centralized catalog does not require a single centralized server for all information, but rather enables the opposite. Legal information can be stored and distributed anarchically via all the world's networks, with the centralized catalog keeping track of where the information resides. | | | |
< < | trash
It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators, compiled by the executive, and debugged by the courts. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process. | > > | The uniform citation protocol will be a rationalized system of citing and finding legal documents, with authorial attribution, time of publication, etc., plus a digital code that allows instant access to the document from the free platform's search interface. | | | |
< < | When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties are characterized by statistical differences in the database's meta-information is in order. What we do know, in the meantime, is that Elsevier has, at least once, manipulated a scientific medical publication for economic reasons. | > > | Apart from the catalog and citation, other aspects of the platform can be decentralized and customized anarchically. For starters, the search interface will be decoupled from the database searched, with the interface freely customizable. Users and groups will be able to release custom interface packages that meet particular objectives and circumstances. Interface packages mimicking the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces will become popular, because they allow previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific human capital--without paying the proprietary services' monopoly rents. | | | |
< < | The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problems associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. | > > | Meanwhile, the meta-information linking legal materials will be continuously updated by law professors and their students. This will initially be an anarchical project, with gradually greater structure and restrictions built in as existing materials are exhaustively annotated. _Nature_'s finding that Wikipedia is just as reliable as the Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that the free legal-research platform can be as reliable as Lexis/Westlaw. With so many smart people using the database, abuses and manipulations can be cleared up quickly and the perpetrators exiled. In the long run, it is inevitable that the free platform would become superior to Lexis/Westlaw in both usefulness and usability. |
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ElliottPaper1 12 - 08 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research
The Political Economy of Legal Research | |
< < | The use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital. By using a particular platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. | > > | Lexis and Westlaw share duopolistic dominance of the United States' market for legal information. The corrupt circumstance enabling the existence of the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly is that the law isn't free. Despite so-called fundamental precepts of The U.S. judiciary's online record system, PACER, charges [[http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html#GP8][8 cents] per page revealed in a search. State courts might offer recent opinions, but older precedents are mostly unavailable. What is freely available online does not have the meta-operability that makes Lexis/Westlaw materials far more valuable. The rest of the cases--what isn't freely available--might still be law (enforced by state violence), but it is constructively proprietary information, hoarded and sold by Lexis/Westlaw.
Of course, Lexis/Westlaw don't "own" the law. Statutes, regulations, and cases are produced by agents of the people's government--they are public property, regardless of public availability. The value added by Lexis/Westlaw is research efficiency--an electronic search of a massive database is infinitely cheaper than scouring physical records at a courthouse, legislature, or library.
It is difficult to overestimate the social costs imposed by the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly's proprietary internment of legal information. It distorts the costs of civil litigation, precluding the pursuit of socially optimal lawsuits. This distortion is amplified when a wide income separate the parties, where the wealthier party has a superior research advantage. Criminal defense attorneys with inadequate resources cannot mount satisfactory defenses.
The use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital. By using a particular platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. With attorney wages what they are, a 10 or 20 percent cut in research efficiency will deter most from moving to a different platform. The platform-specific investment also discourages users of the existing platforms from | | A side effect of the duopoly model is that Lexis and Westlaw share an incentive to differentiate their platforms. If they had identical interfaces, then habituated users could costlessly change systems, and market competition would preclude the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw.
A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoils of clutter that suffice as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book," in which managers are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase new editions. | |
< < | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent Elsevier, meanwhile, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress. | > > | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent Elsevier, meanwhile, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress. | | | |
< < | Complicity in the Legal Academy | | | |
< < | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | | | |
< < | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of their graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free efforts, but Columbia ignores them. Columbia's legal-research curriculum ensures that Lexis/Westlaw can tax Columbia graduates. | > > | --+++ Columbia's Complicity | | | |
< < | Law as Intellectual Property
The corrupt circumstance enabling the existence of the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly is that the law isn't free. The free PDFs provided by federal courts do not have the metaoperability that makes Lexis/Westlaw cases that much more functional. The free PDFs provided by state courts--oops, well, actually, many state courts don't even provide free electronic versions of judicial opinions. In these ubiquitous cases, the law--the system of norms enforced by state violence--is constructive proprietary information, guarded and sold by Lexis/Westlaw. | > > | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | | | |
< < | It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators, compiled by the executive, and debugged by the courts. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process. | > > | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of law graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free services, but Columbia's legal-research curriculum ignores them. Meanwhile, Columbia pairs this indirect subsidy with payment for academic use of the services. | | | |
< < | When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties are characterized by statistical differences in the database's meta-information is in order. What we do know, in the meantime, is that Elsevier has, at least once, manipulated a scientific medical publication for economic reasons. | > > | The Free Alternative | | | |
< < | The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problems associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. | > > | The defining feature of the contemporary legal-research market is that its product, legal information, is a zero-marginal-cost digital good. Digital goods are characterized by two unique properties, according to Eben Moglen: 1) functional digital goods are most efficiently produced anarchically, while 2) non-functional digital goods are most efficiently distributed anarchically. Whether legal information is functional or non-functional--and whether "functional" and "non-functional" are coherent and mutually exclusive categories--is an interesting question for a later day. In the present context, though, it is a reasonable expectation that both properties would be extant for legal information. | | | |
< < | The Free Alternative | > > | The practical implication is the deproprietization of all legal information, its | | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. A free legal research platform might consist of a public database of legal materials maintained by the nation's largest law schools. The meta-information linking cases will be a continual project undertaken by law professors and their students. | | A not insignificant objection to this is that, as a product of unpaid altruists, it would not be as reliable as Lexis/WestLaw. This is possible, but at the very least it will be a decent alternative for those who cannot afford or who are politically opposed to Lexis/Westlaw. Besides, the science journal Nature found that the facts presented in Wikipedia are just as reliable as those written in Encyclopedia Britannica.
Another objection to the free platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. Wikipedia, again, is a testament to the growth of internal safeguards against abuses. | |
> > | trash
It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators, compiled by the executive, and debugged by the courts. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process.
When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties are characterized by statistical differences in the database's meta-information is in order. What we do know, in the meantime, is that Elsevier has, at least once, manipulated a scientific medical publication for economic reasons.
The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problems associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. |
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ElliottPaper1 11 - 07 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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< < | The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly | > > | The Lexis/Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Legal Research | |
The Political Economy of Legal Research | | A side effect of the duopoly model is that Lexis and Westlaw share an incentive to differentiate their platforms. If they had identical interfaces, then habituated users could costlessly change systems, and market competition would preclude the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. | |
< < | A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be imposed. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoil of clutter that suffices as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (relative to Precydent's parsimony). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book"--that is, the editors are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes in new editions so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase the newest copy. | > > | A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be extracted. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoils of clutter that suffice as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (Cf. Precydent's parsimonious appearance). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book," in which managers are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase new editions. | | | |
< < | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent, Elsevier, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress. | > > | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent Elsevier, meanwhile, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress. | | | |
< < | The Role of The Law School | > > | Complicity in the Legal Academy | | | |
< < | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with the Westlaw legal research system and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research Workshop, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--just shy of one email per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | > > | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with Westlaw and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research course, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--about one per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of their graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free efforts, but Columbia ignores them. Columbia's legal-research curriculum ensures that Lexis/Westlaw can tax Columbia graduates. |
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ElliottPaper1 10 - 07 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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< < | The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | > > | The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly | | | |
< < | Introduction
During my first semester at Columbia, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with the Westlaw legal research system and submit classwork via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. I suppose I would have failed the course had I not so registered. | > > | The Political Economy of Legal Research | | | |
< < | Since registering as a Columbia Law student 13 months ago, I have received 56 emails from LexisNexis--just shy of one email per week. These emails consist in bribes to convince me to use their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an artificial legal research task in exchange for "Lexis Points," which can be redeemed for merchandise. The purpose of this exercise, naturally, is to habituate me to performing legal-research tasks on their system. In addition to generalized legal-research human capital, use of Lexis or WestLaw? produces system-specific human capital being built here; | > > | The use of Lexis/WestLaw produces platform-specific human capital. By using a particular platform, a user becomes habituated to and proficient with that platform, the benefits of which cannot be recovered on alternative platforms. To the extent that platform-specific human capital has been vested, Lexis/Westlaw can extract rents from their users; as long as the monopoly-rent tax is less than the costs of rebuilding platform-specific human capital for another platform, the user will remain loyal and pay the tax. | | | |
< < | LexisNexis? and WestLaw? are responsible for [[][__ percent]] of the market for legal information. | > > | A side effect of the duopoly model is that Lexis and Westlaw share an incentive to differentiate their platforms. If they had identical interfaces, then habituated users could costlessly change systems, and market competition would preclude the extraction of monopoly rents. This dynamic can be observed in the functionally equivalent but symbolically differentiated search terms implemented by Lexis and Westlaw. | | | |
> > | A less obvious implication is that Lexis/Westlaw have a standalone incentive to complicate their platforms. The more complicated a platform, the more platform-specific human capital can be invested, and correspondingly the higher the monopoly tax that can be imposed. This hypothesis is confirmed by a passing glance at the staggering turmoil of clutter that suffices as the Lexis/Westlaw interfaces (relative to Precydent's parsimony). This is a systemic problem related to that plaguing the "Blue Book"--that is, the editors are incentivized to repeatedly deliver arbitrary changes in new editions so that lawyers and legal scholars are forced to purchase the newest copy. | | | |
< < | The Political Economy of Legal Research | > > | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and Westlaw--In 2005, Lexis managed revenues of $8.94 billion with a 23.1% profit margin. Lexis's corporate parent, Elsevier, spent [$12.5 million between 1998 and 2006 lobbying the U.S. Congress. | | | |
< < | Lexis and WestLaw? do not provide services to public libraries. | > > | The Role of The Law School | | | |
< < | The ventures are profitable. LexisNexis? , for instance, managed a 23.1% profit margin in 2005. Lexis's parent corporation, Elsevier, spent http://rafaelsidi.blogspot.com/2006/01/reed-elsevier-among-top-uk-spenders-on.html? lobbying the U.S. Congress. | > > | During my first semester at Columbia Law School, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with the Westlaw legal research system and submit all graded work via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. Since registering on LexisNexis 13 months ago as part of my Legal Research Workshop, I have received 56 emails from Lexis--just shy of one email per week. These emails offer me "Lexis Points" in exchange for using their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an arbitrary legal-research task or tutorial. | | | |
> > | The purpose and effect of Westlaw's TWEN services and Lexis's bribes, of course, are to habituate me to working on their respective research platform. By participating in such policies, Columbia is complicit in the services' later abuse of their graduate's platform-specific human capital. There are decent commercial alternatives? to Lexis/Westlaw, as well as irreproachable free efforts, but Columbia ignores them. Columbia's legal-research curriculum ensures that Lexis/Westlaw can tax Columbia graduates. | | Law as Intellectual Property | |
< < | It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators and compiled by the organs of the executive and judicial branches of the government. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process.
When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An empirical investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties have statistical differences in the database's meta-information would be helpful in this regard. | > > | The corrupt circumstance enabling the existence of the Lexis/Westlaw duopoly is that the law isn't free. The free PDFs provided by federal courts do not have the metaoperability that makes Lexis/Westlaw cases that much more functional. The free PDFs provided by state courts--oops, well, actually, many state courts don't even provide free electronic versions of judicial opinions. In these ubiquitous cases, the law--the system of norms enforced by state violence--is constructive proprietary information, guarded and sold by Lexis/Westlaw. | | | |
< < | What we do know, though, is that these publishers have manipulated their publications for monetary reasons. In 2004, Elsevier killed a medical journal article about the rates of cancer mortality of former IBM employees under pressure from IBM. | > > | It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators, compiled by the executive, and debugged by the courts. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process. | | | |
< < | Discussion
Heller, The Gridlock Economy | > > | When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties are characterized by statistical differences in the database's meta-information is in order. What we do know, in the meantime, is that Elsevier has, at least once, manipulated a scientific medical publication for economic reasons. | | | |
< < | Stake, "The Property Instinct" | > > | The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problems associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. | | | |
< < | The effectiveness of a distribution system can be measured by its cost. The ineffectiveness of the old-world music distribution system was illustrated by the share of its revenues that went to feeding the distribution system, rather than the content-production system. The same can be said of Lexis and WestLaw? | > > | The Free Alternative | | | |
< < | A promising up-and-comer is Precydent. Its parsimonious interface is superior to Lexis/WestLaw. But my first search query, "hamer v sidway" did not turn up the result that I obviously wanted.
Columbia's revolting relationship with Lexis and WestLaw?
A rarely considered alternative to the proprietary Lexis/WestLaw systems would consist of a vast wiki-ized database of legal materials, with meta-information about connections between cases filled in by the lawyers and law professors. A not insignificant objection to this is that it would not be as reliable as Lexis/WestLaw but see the Nature study demonstrating Wikipedia's comparable reliability to the Encyclopedia Brittanica. | > > | The social benefits of a free alternative to Lexis/Westlaw are incalculable. A free legal research platform might consist of a public database of legal materials maintained by the nation's largest law schools. The meta-information linking cases will be a continual project undertaken by law professors and their students. | | The people behind FastCase estimate that scanning and transcribing every federal and state case and statute will cost them $6 million. Apart from the unionized-labor complication, the top ten Ivy League schools could easily fund a similar open-source effort. | | An alternative to a centralized free-law resource would be instead a uniform system of citation, pagination, and meta-data standards for legal materials that could be implemented on a wide range of information-hosting platforms. | |
< < | A powerful objection to the proposal for a publicly editable open-source legal-information platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions.
The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problematics associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. | > > | A free legal wiki would separate content from presentation, allowing users and groups to customize the presentation of information to meet particular goals and circumstances. The free platform can parrot the presentation systems of Lexis and Westlaw, allowing previously habituated users to recover the benefits of their platform-specific capital without paying the monopoly rents exacted by proprietary systems. | | | |
< < | | > > | A not insignificant objection to this is that, as a product of unpaid altruists, it would not be as reliable as Lexis/WestLaw. This is possible, but at the very least it will be a decent alternative for those who cannot afford or who are politically opposed to Lexis/Westlaw. Besides, the science journal Nature found that the facts presented in Wikipedia are just as reliable as those written in Encyclopedia Britannica. | | | |
< < | | | \ No newline at end of file | |
> > | Another objection to the free platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. Wikipedia, again, is a testament to the growth of internal safeguards against abuses. |
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ElliottPaper1 9 - 07 Nov 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law
Introduction | |
> > | During my first semester at Columbia, my Legal Practice Workshop instructor required his students to register with the Westlaw legal research system and submit classwork via [[lawschool.westlaw.com][TWEN], Westlaw's proprietary online courseware. I suppose I would have failed the course had I not so registered.
Since registering as a Columbia Law student 13 months ago, I have received 56 emails from LexisNexis--just shy of one email per week. These emails consist in bribes to convince me to use their service--not for schoolwork, but for playing around on an artificial legal research task in exchange for "Lexis Points," which can be redeemed for merchandise. The purpose of this exercise, naturally, is to habituate me to performing legal-research tasks on their system. In addition to generalized legal-research human capital, use of Lexis or WestLaw? produces system-specific human capital being built here;
LexisNexis? and WestLaw? are responsible for [[][__ percent]] of the market for legal information. | | The Political Economy of Legal Research
Lexis and WestLaw? do not provide services to public libraries. |
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ElliottPaper1 8 - 27 Oct 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | A powerful objection to the proposal for a publicly editable open-source legal-information platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. | |
< < | | > > | The problems with Lexis and Westlaw are representative of the more general problematics associated with the proprietization of functional knowledge. Bergstrom (2001) showed that nonprofit economics journals were generally superior to commercial economics journals, despite the fact that similar commercial journals charged almost ten times as much for subscriptions to their journals. | | |
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ElliottPaper1 7 - 27 Oct 2008 - Main.RickSchwartz
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The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | A powerful objection to the proposal for a publicly editable open-source legal-information platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. | |
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ElliottPaper1 6 - 27 Oct 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | Lexis and WestLaw? do not provide services to public libraries. | |
< < | Open Access in a Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law Schools, and the Legal Information Market
An Open Model for a Web-Based Semantic Case Law Repository
Legal Information Management in a Global and Digital Age: Revolution and Tradition
The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship
Neutral Citation, Court Web Sites, and Access to Case Law
Forbes, The Law Goes Open Source
http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/1111
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/20/technology/20westlaw.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2007/11/competition-bet.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duopoly
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wexis
WinterSpring? +2003" target="_top">http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+147+(WinterSpring? +2003) (Arguing for the merit of proprietary legal databases. Pg. 152-53)
http://www.crl.edu/content/DigArc/DigArc2/LexisNexisprofile.pdf (LexisNexis? has 23% profit margins)
http://www.lexis.com/research/xlink?app=00075&view=full&searchtype=get&search=39+Ariz.+St.+L.J.+20
[[http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=31179fc816dce014ff540cfd65848bac&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b62%20Wash%20%26%20Lee%20L.%20Rev.%201553%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=372&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b266%20F.3d%201155%2cat%201169%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAb&_md5=b5a6a6414575b90cf751100ce709de0b][
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts
Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari
HOW NEUTRAL CITATION AND AMERICA'S LAW SCHOOLS CAN CURE OUR STRANGE DEVOTION TO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ORTHODOXY AND THE CONSTRICTION OF OPEN AND EQUAL ACCESS TO THE LAW
"This article addresses the challenge facing law students to preserve some sense of individual voice and ownership of their writing as they enter a professional discourse community and negotiate its formal structures and idioms."
"The writer must adhere to this format despite having found and read the opinion using Westlaw, Lexis, Casemaker or some other digital source"
"Because many legal materials are increasingly available only online, and because judges are showing a greater willingness to rely on non-legal information available on the web, the Article concludes that a lawyer cannot competently represent a client without going beyond Westlaw and Lexis and conducting research on the internet."
[[]["The open access movement espouses the principle that access to all scholarly communication, including legal scholarship, should be made available to the world at no cost via the Internet. ... Further, this Article examines in detail the effects of applying open access principles to legal scholarship, current options for law schools wishing to establish a repository, and the growing number of law school repositories currently in existence"]]
"I would like to suggest that the law reviews that publish the bluebook have an incentive to engage in excessive innovation. This is not a prediction of a race-to-the-bottom, but a prediction of excessive innocuous change. The inefficiency comes in the need to learn arbitrary new rules, not in the quality of the rules themselves. The bluebook publishers have this perverse incentive because every new edition of the bluebook generates a large one-time demand as lawyers and legal libraries are driven to buy the authoritative source. It is not surprising that the bluebook is now in its fifteenth edition. Of course there may be pressing aesthetic reasons why a certain reference needs to be put in large and small capital letters instead of italics, 47 but along with these aesthetics is the knowledge that each new edition will reap an economic windfall. 48"
"The well-financed efforts of an entrenched interest group to resist open access in most disciplines means that the broad open access movement has a long row to hoe before we can reap the benefits that the Internet promises for scholarly communication. The one discipline where conditions are ripe for more rapid evolution to open access is law in the United States. Scholarly communication in American law also is channeled primarily through the medium of the journal article. But the editorial and economic structure of American legal scholarship is sufficiently different from other disciplines that no group stands to gain from resisting open access other than commercial legal publishers, who lack direct leverage to sabotage the movement for open access law."
"The Science Commons approach also provides for attribution of first publication by the law review, something that is not mentioned in any of the standard accounts of open access. ... The move to peer refereeing tends to carry with it a move to commercial publishing, and in so doing destroys the open access opportunity that student-edited law reviews generate.
THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN ACCESS LAW PUBLISHING
"...legal scholarship is moving from the long form (treatises and law review articles) to the short form (very short articles, blog posts, and online collaborations)." (Solum)
"While the Internet provides access to many free sources of legal information, they are likely to be substantially less useful and efficient than fee-based legal resource providers."
The Future of the Casebook: An Argument for the Open-Source Approach (see pg. 10 on Wexis)
"An open access approach would mean new pools of course materials for professors to draw on, new means of interaction and collaboration between professors and students, and new possibilities for restructuring the law school curriculum."
[[]["For other academic disciplines, commercial publishing has the significant drawback of making it really expensive for scholars to get access to what's happening in their fields. Open access reduces the cost of access dramatically, whether or not it encourages scholars to read the work. In law, scholars already have ready access to their colleagues' work. And they still don't read it. What's the point of making the work ... free?]] ... Once LexisNexis? and Westlaw started putting full texts of law reviews on their databases, the authority of print started to recede, leaving the authority of the publisher and, to a lesser extent, the authority of limited access. A lot of law professors these days never actually handle original physical copies of law review articles... | > > | The ventures are profitable. LexisNexis? , for instance, managed a 23.1% profit margin in 2005. Lexis's parent corporation, Elsevier, spent http://rafaelsidi.blogspot.com/2006/01/reed-elsevier-among-top-uk-spenders-on.html? lobbying the U.S. Congress. | |
Law as Intellectual Property
It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators and compiled by the organs of the executive and judicial branches of the government. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process.
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> > | When law is proprietized, an obvious concern would be manipulation of the law by its private owners for their personal benefit. It would be rational, supposing low probability of the infraction being publicized, for Elsevier/Thomson to tamper with case law concerning company litigation. In a competitive legal-information marketplace, objectivity would be an overriding concern, because competitors would publicize infractions and keep each database honest. But here, we have duopoly, and that invites collusion. There has been little, if any, investigation into whether Thomson and Elsevier have attempted such manipulation. An empirical investigation into whether cases in which Elsevier/Thomson (and subsidiaries) are parties have statistical differences in the database's meta-information would be helpful in this regard.
What we do know, though, is that these publishers have manipulated their publications for monetary reasons. In 2004, Elsevier killed a medical journal article about the rates of cancer mortality of former IBM employees under pressure from IBM. | | Discussion
Heller, The Gridlock Economy | | Law journals should be the first organizations to sign onto the free-law effort. Since they are locked in libraries and . On the one hand, this circumstance protects them from being widely read and thereby condemned for incompetence. But, as demonstrated in Chris Anderson's The Long Tail, there is demand, however small, for a virtually infinite range of creative and functional content (pg. ). By unlocking the storage and meta-connection of law journal articles, the free-law effort would facilitate the synthesis of wider blocks of information and argument. | |
< < | An alternative to a centralized free-law resource would be instead a uniform system of citation, pagination, and meta-data standards for legal materials that could be implemented on a wide range of information-hosting platforms. Part of the system would be
http://www.findlaw.com/ | > > | An alternative to a centralized free-law resource would be instead a uniform system of citation, pagination, and meta-data standards for legal materials that could be implemented on a wide range of information-hosting platforms. | | | |
> > | A powerful objection to the proposal for a publicly editable open-source legal-information platform is that private actors would manipulate the meta-information to sabotage opposing legal actions. | | |
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ElliottPaper1 4 - 19 Oct 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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META TOPICPARENT | name="WebPreferences" |
The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN ACCESS LAW PUBLISHING | |
> > | "...legal scholarship is moving from the long form (treatises and law review articles) to the short form (very short articles, blog posts, and online collaborations)." (Solum)
"While the Internet provides access to many free sources of legal information, they are likely to be substantially less useful and efficient than fee-based legal resource providers."
The Future of the Casebook: An Argument for the Open-Source Approach (see pg. 10 on Wexis)
"An open access approach would mean new pools of course materials for professors to draw on, new means of interaction and collaboration between professors and students, and new possibilities for restructuring the law school curriculum."
[[]["For other academic disciplines, commercial publishing has the significant drawback of making it really expensive for scholars to get access to what's happening in their fields. Open access reduces the cost of access dramatically, whether or not it encourages scholars to read the work. In law, scholars already have ready access to their colleagues' work. And they still don't read it. What's the point of making the work ... free?]] ... Once LexisNexis? and Westlaw started putting full texts of law reviews on their databases, the authority of print started to recede, leaving the authority of the publisher and, to a lesser extent, the authority of limited access. A lot of law professors these days never actually handle original physical copies of law review articles... | |
Law as Intellectual Property |
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ElliottPaper1 3 - 18 Oct 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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META TOPICPARENT | name="WebPreferences" |
The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | WinterSpring? +2003" target="_top">http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+147+(WinterSpring? +2003) (Arguing for the merit of proprietary legal databases. Pg. 152-53) | |
> > | http://www.lexis.com/research/xlink?app=00075&view=full&searchtype=get&search=39+Ariz.+St.+L.J.+20
[[http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=31179fc816dce014ff540cfd65848bac&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b62%20Wash%20%26%20Lee%20L.%20Rev.%201553%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=372&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b266%20F.3d%201155%2cat%201169%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAb&_md5=b5a6a6414575b90cf751100ce709de0b][
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts
Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari
HOW NEUTRAL CITATION AND AMERICA'S LAW SCHOOLS CAN CURE OUR STRANGE DEVOTION TO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ORTHODOXY AND THE CONSTRICTION OF OPEN AND EQUAL ACCESS TO THE LAW
"This article addresses the challenge facing law students to preserve some sense of individual voice and ownership of their writing as they enter a professional discourse community and negotiate its formal structures and idioms."
"The writer must adhere to this format despite having found and read the opinion using Westlaw, Lexis, Casemaker or some other digital source"
"Because many legal materials are increasingly available only online, and because judges are showing a greater willingness to rely on non-legal information available on the web, the Article concludes that a lawyer cannot competently represent a client without going beyond Westlaw and Lexis and conducting research on the internet."
[[]["The open access movement espouses the principle that access to all scholarly communication, including legal scholarship, should be made available to the world at no cost via the Internet. ... Further, this Article examines in detail the effects of applying open access principles to legal scholarship, current options for law schools wishing to establish a repository, and the growing number of law school repositories currently in existence"]]
"I would like to suggest that the law reviews that publish the bluebook have an incentive to engage in excessive innovation. This is not a prediction of a race-to-the-bottom, but a prediction of excessive innocuous change. The inefficiency comes in the need to learn arbitrary new rules, not in the quality of the rules themselves. The bluebook publishers have this perverse incentive because every new edition of the bluebook generates a large one-time demand as lawyers and legal libraries are driven to buy the authoritative source. It is not surprising that the bluebook is now in its fifteenth edition. Of course there may be pressing aesthetic reasons why a certain reference needs to be put in large and small capital letters instead of italics, 47 but along with these aesthetics is the knowledge that each new edition will reap an economic windfall. 48"
"The well-financed efforts of an entrenched interest group to resist open access in most disciplines means that the broad open access movement has a long row to hoe before we can reap the benefits that the Internet promises for scholarly communication. The one discipline where conditions are ripe for more rapid evolution to open access is law in the United States. Scholarly communication in American law also is channeled primarily through the medium of the journal article. But the editorial and economic structure of American legal scholarship is sufficiently different from other disciplines that no group stands to gain from resisting open access other than commercial legal publishers, who lack direct leverage to sabotage the movement for open access law."
"The Science Commons approach also provides for attribution of first publication by the law review, something that is not mentioned in any of the standard accounts of open access. ... The move to peer refereeing tends to carry with it a move to commercial publishing, and in so doing destroys the open access opportunity that student-edited law reviews generate.
THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN ACCESS LAW PUBLISHING
| | Law as Intellectual Property
It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators and compiled by the organs of the executive and judicial branches of the government. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process.
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ElliottPaper1 2 - 18 Oct 2008 - Main.ElliottAsh
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META TOPICPARENT | name="WebPreferences" |
The Lexis-Westlaw Duopoly and the Proprietization of Law | | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wexis | |
> > | WinterSpring? +2003" target="_top">http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+147+(WinterSpring? +2003) (Arguing for the merit of proprietary legal databases. Pg. 152-53) | | Law as Intellectual Property | |
> > | It would be argued that law has expressive, aesthetic content and is thus deserving of copyright. By virtue of the fact that some judges, as composers of legal materials, [[cite]evidently believe this, there is some truth to the argument. But it is an unfortunate attitude, and it has deleterious effects on the quality of the fruits of legal enterprise. Law should be conceived as software code rather than poetry, written by legislators and compiled by the organs of the executive and judicial branches of the government. This metaphor offers hints as to how problems with the legislative versus executive versus judicial process should be dealt with. For example, as illustrated in [[cite][Anarchism Triumphant], anarchical production of software code is a superior strategy, and it should be applied to the production of legislation. The [[cite][GPLv3 process] is a preliminary example of an anarchical legal drafting process. | | Discussion
Heller, The Gridlock Economy
Stake, "The Property Instinct" | |
< < | http://www.precydent.com/
http://www.fastcase.com/ | > > | A promising up-and-comer is Precydent. Its parsimonious interface is superior to Lexis/WestLaw. But my first search query, "hamer v sidway" did not turn up the result that I obviously wanted. | | Columbia's revolting relationship with Lexis and WestLaw? | |
> > | A rarely considered alternative to the proprietary Lexis/WestLaw systems would consist of a vast wiki-ized database of legal materials, with meta-information about connections between cases filled in by the lawyers and law professors. A not insignificant objection to this is that it would not be as reliable as Lexis/WestLaw but see the Nature study demonstrating Wikipedia's comparable reliability to the Encyclopedia Brittanica.
The people behind FastCase estimate that scanning and transcribing every federal and state case and statute will cost them $6 million. Apart from the unionized-labor complication, the top ten Ivy League schools could easily fund a similar open-source effort.
Law journals should be the first organizations to sign onto the free-law effort. Since they are locked in libraries and . On the one hand, this circumstance protects them from being widely read and thereby condemned for incompetence. But, as demonstrated in Chris Anderson's The Long Tail, there is demand, however small, for a virtually infinite range of creative and functional content (pg. ). By unlocking the storage and meta-connection of law journal articles, the free-law effort would facilitate the synthesis of wider blocks of information and argument.
An alternative to a centralized free-law resource would be instead a uniform system of citation, pagination, and meta-data standards for legal materials that could be implemented on a wide range of information-hosting platforms. Part of the system would be
http://www.findlaw.com/ | | |
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