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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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| | | While it will be up to the cybersecurity forces to monitor and detect any suspicious activities on the internet, I wonder what I, as a lawyer or as one of the people, can do to help protect the integrity and legitimacy of our democratic system against malicious attempts to manipulate public opinion. | |
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< | First, knowingly distributing fake information with the intention of manipulating public opinion to harm a political candidate or party should be acknowledged as a separate crime subject to severe punishment. Of course, spreading information is a form of speech protected by the constitution in many countries. The courts in the U.S. and South Korea share views that freedom of speech includes (at least some of) false speech. See, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); 2008Hunba157, Korean Constitutional Court (2010.12.28.) Also, political speech is especially strongly protected in the U.S. See, McIntyre? v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). However, freedom of speech is not absolute and the government may restrict speech as long as it is justifiable. See, Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4289 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2009). In the U.S., justifiable restrictions on political speech must survive a strict scrutiny test. In Korea, a proportionality test is applied. Whatever level of scrutiny is applied, my view is that prohibition of the aforementioned kind should stand such test because i) false statements of facts have less value for they don't contribute to the market of ideas, and ii) after all, it is for democracy's sake that we advocate for freedom of speech so that, if the consequences of speech are that it actually harms democracy materially, it would be meaningless to protect such speech. | >
> | First, knowingly distributing fake information with the intention of manipulating public opinion to harm a political candidate or party should be acknowledged as a separate crime subject to severe punishment. Of course, spreading information is a form of speech protected by the constitution in many countries. The courts in the U.S. and South Korea share views that freedom of speech includes (at least some of) false speech. See, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); 2008Hunba157, Korean Constitutional Court (2010.12.28.) Political speech in the U.S. is particularly strongly protected. See, McIntyre? v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). However, freedom of speech is not absolute and the government may restrict speech if such restriction is justifiable under strict scrutiny (in case of political speech in the U.S.) or proportionality test (in Korea). Whatever level of scrutiny applies, my view is that criminalization of the aforementioned kind would stand the test for the following reasons: i) false statements of facts have less, if any, value for "they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas", see dissenting opinion in Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746; and ii) after all, it is for democracy's sake that we protect freedom of speech so that, if the consequences of fake speech are that it actually harms the integrity of democratic procedure, it would be meaningless to protect such harmful speech. | | | | |
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< | Second, it should be prohibited to monitor people's online activities for purposes that have not been properly disclosed to and consented by the individual. Although websites provide notices such as cookie policies, most time the information is insufficient, too vague. Moreover, they don't provide the option to 'opt-out' because it is either you agree to the policy or you cannot use this website. Further, one cannot choose the purpose and use of one's information and must either take it or leave it all. | >
> | Second, it should be prohibited to collect and use personal information for purposes other than inevitably necessary to provide requested services. As explained before, public opinion manipulation is most powerful and effective if accompanied by personal big data analysis and individual behavioral targeting. Thus, by limiting the collection of personal data to the minimum extent necessary to provide the services requested by the data subject and prohibiting the use of such data for other purposes, we could effectively neutralize attempts of public opinion manipulation on the internet. Although today's websites provide notices such as cookie policies, most times the information is insufficient and too vague to fully understand who collects and uses which information for what purposes. Moreover, it is not possible to refuse or restrict such collection or use because it is either you agree to the policy as whole or you cannot use the entire services of the website. Even if there were a checkbox type of consent for every data collected and used, it would still be problematic because a person's data will inevitably include information relating to others in which case consent by that other person would also be required. Therefore, this problem cannot be solved by mere disclosure or consent but must be that the collection and use is restricted to the minimum extent necessary by law. | | | | |
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< | It's not clear what
this paragraph has to do with the preceding parts of the draft. I
think the best route to a stronger essay is precisely to explore
further the relationship between this last call, for "data
protection" law, and democracy. That might help to explain the
complex relationship between problematic influence and core free
speech, which is presently covered over by the punitive tone
embodied in the idea of criminal regulation of political expression.
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