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| | | -- GueinahBlaise - 11 Nov 2023
Internet Voting: The Battle between Voting integrity and Voting Accessibility | | | Internet Voting: The Battle between Voting integrity and Voting Accessibility | |
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< | | | | Introduction | |
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< | As I read the articles on voting I found myself absorbing the knowledge through a hypercritical lens. The repeated sentiments from the McGlinchey? , Raney, and Moglen pieces are that internet voting is far too risky to our democratic and threatens election integrity. While I didn’t necessarily disagree with this analysis, I found myself asking to what extent this all really mattered. I began this essay writing process asking a pretty basic question: Are we not too far gone? Would internet voting be that much worse?
*Security and Privacy Concerns with Internet Voting | >
> | As I read the articles on voting I found myself absorbing the knowledge through a hypercritical lens. The repeated sentiments from the Raney, and Moglen pieces are that internet voting is far too risky to our democratic and threatens election integrity. Proponents of internet voting often say that it increases voter accessibility and turnout. However, is internet voting necessary for this? Are election integrity and election accessibility mutually exclusive? | | | | |
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< | As it currently stands, most cybersecurity experts are clear that “widespread internet voting at this point is a bad idea” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer).
Citing summary of popular coverage is not sufficient. You want to encounter the arguments made by people who know something. Go to their writing.
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> | How Risky is Internet Voting | | | | |
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< | The security concerns with online voting are well documented. When initially thinking about the security concerns of online voting, I fell into the trap that most Americans fall into by thinking: can online voting really be that insecure? We engage in “risky” online activities, both in and out of the political realm, everyday. Our president is on X (formerly known as Twitter). Our medical information is on online portals. Our tax returns, which contain our social security numbers, are done online. Millions of dollars are transferred on the internet everyday. Haven’t we gone too far as a society to really be concerned with online voting. | >
> | Voting is unique from the various risky online behaviors we engage in online in that it is a fundamental right that has heavy implications and effects on our society. The stakes are higher. Additionally,voting requires a level of secrecy and privacy. The votes must be correctly and properly counted, without exposing who voted for whom. In the other activities mistakes are “traceable.” In the case of voting, however, “intentional lack of traceability of a cast ballot back to a voter due to the requirement of a secret ballot demands different technical controls than other types of online transactions" (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). If there are any mistakes, perceived or otherwise, there can be some serious repercussions. Take for example the conspiracies around the 2020 elections where there was an insurrection over the election results. | | | | |
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No, obviously. Your examples are diverse, they do not speak to the integrity of elections, and there are laws involvced you don't bother to mention, precisely to safequard interests you are casually dismissing.
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< | Missing in my initial analysis is the fact that voting is very different from the aforementioned activities in that it is a fundamental right that has heavy implications and effects on our society. | >
> | Security and Privacy Concerns with Internet Voting | | | | |
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So why not write from the beginning on the basis of the insight you already have?
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> | What do we mean when we say the internet is not secure? Coleman and Freelon In Digital Politics Coleman and Freelon discuss how, according to ProPublica? , the NSA is winning its war on encryption and has been able to access the digital footprints of citizens (https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eN4WCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA103&dq=%22accessibility%22+internet+voting&ots=R3n2Av7z4a&sig=bRS4xRMKvqc7-uVF4FmSAuHYbMs#v=onepage&q&f=false). For cybersecurity experts their ability to circumvent internet security shows just how dangerous internet voting is (https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eN4WCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA103&dq=%22accessibility%22+internet+voting&ots=R3n2Av7z4a&sig=bRS4xRMKvqc7-uVF4FmSAuHYbMs#v=onepage&q&f=false). There are threats of “worms, viruses, and Trojan horses.” Also, this proves that the American government, as well as foreign governments, are willing to throw a large amount of resources towards deciding elections. Even the scientists at the pentagon acknowledge that voting programs like SERVE are especially vulnerable to cyberattacks (https://www.govexec.com/defense/2004/02/pentagon-scraps-plan-for-online-voting-in-2004-elections/15877/print/) . | | | | |
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> | While many experts understand the desire to use internet voting, many of them believe that, as a society, we “may have to sacrifice convenience for security” (See Raney piece). In fact, UC Berkeley, with the leadership of Bradley Tusk, Uber’s first political adviser, tried addressing these issues with a working group in 2021 (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). While it acknowledged that, “Internet ballot return has the potential to significantly improve upon existing solutions for accessibility,” after more than a year working on this issue, the working group concluded that (1) “that internet ballot return has different technology needs and a different acceptable level of risk when compared to other activities we conduct on the internet,” and that (2) “that the current cybersecurity environment and state of technology make it infeasible for the Working Group to draft responsible standards to support the use of internet ballot return in U.S. public elections at this time.” (https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot-Return.pdf). En route to this conclusion they point to the absence of a directly voter-verifiable ballot of record and the fact that internet ballot returns carry larger risks of wholesale attacks than other common voting methods, to support their findings (https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot-Return.pdf). | | | | |
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< | The stakes are higher. Additionally, unlike the other activities mentioned, voting requires a level of secrecy and privacy. The votes must be correctly and properly counted, without exposing who voted for whom. In the other activities mistakes are “traceable.” In the case of voting, however, “intentional lack of traceability of a cast ballot back to a voter due to the requirement of a secret ballot demands different technical controls than other types of online transactions" (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). If there are any mistakes, perceived or otherwise, there can be some serious repercussions. Take for example the conspiracies around the 2020 elections where there was an insurrection over the election results.
That being said, what do we mean when we say the internet is not secure? Coleman and Freelon In Digital Politics Coleman and Freelon discuss how, according to ProPublica? , the NSA is winning its war on encryption and has been able to access the digital footprints of citizens (https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eN4WCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA103&dq=%22accessibility%22+internet+voting&ots=R3n2Av7z4a&sig=bRS4xRMKvqc7-uVF4FmSAuHYbMs#v=onepage&q&f=false). For cybersecurity experts their ability to circumvent internet security shows just how dangerous internet voting is (https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eN4WCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA103&dq=%22accessibility%22+internet+voting&ots=R3n2Av7z4a&sig=bRS4xRMKvqc7-uVF4FmSAuHYbMs#v=onepage&q&f=false). There are threats of “worms, viruses, and Trojan horses.” Also, this proves that the American government, as well as foreign governments, are willing to throw a large amount of resources towards deciding elections. Even the scientists at the pentagon acknowledge that voting programs like SERVE are especially vulnerable to cyberattacks (See McGlinchey? piece).
While many experts understand the the desire to use internet voting, many of them believe that, as a society, we “may have to sacrifice convenience for security” (See Raney piece). In fact, UC Berkeley, with the leadership of Bradley Tusk, Uber’s first political adviser, tried addressing these issues with a working group in 2021. However after more than a year working on this issue, the working group concluded that “The current cybersecurity environment and state of technology make it infeasible for the Working Group to draft responsible standards to support the use of internet ballot return in U.S. public elections at this time," (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). | >
> | The UC Berkeley Working Group ended their report with a discussion of the need to balance voting integrity and voting accessibility. They explain that, “Election officials must balance fairness, accessibility, security, transparency, equity, and reliability when delivering solutions for voters.” In the case of internet voting, the primary concerns officials are balancing are security (or integrity) and accessibility. In this case, “while the Working Group believes it is currently infeasible to draft responsible standards on internet ballot return, it also recognizes that all current methods of voting have risks that must be carefully managed and all present benefits intended to serve the varied needs of voters” (https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot-Return.pdf). The working group does not speak about the voting integrity and accessibility as if they are mutually exclusive. Instead we must carefully consider the benefits of methods like internet voting and should not “eliminat[e] these forms of voting entirely without reasonable alternatives could produce an unacceptable risk to those with accessibility needs” (https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot-Return.pdf). They went on to say that doing so “would place election officials in a position of violating the requirements of the HAVA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), expanding them could present unacceptable security risks to those same voters and the integrity of the election” but left it up to election officials, who they believe to be in a better position to balance these factors. | | | | |
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< | (Perceived) Benefits of Internet Voting: Accessibility and Turnout | >
> | Accessibility of Internet Voting and the Alternatives | | | While not all states allow voting online, about “26 states and Washington, D.C., allow military and overseas voters to return their ballots by email, and seven states allow those voters to return their ballots using an online portal. A few additional states allow voters to return ballots via fax” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). Additionally, about 13 states permit those with disabilities to vote using one of the aforementioned methods (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). If online voting is so risky why do so many states allow it as an option? | |
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How about real sources, not radio news on the we?b
| | | There are several reasons many states opted to allow internet voting, chiefs among them are ignorance, accessibility and voter turnout. For starters, many of the states who have internet voting options allowed them before 2010, prior to any widespread concern over the security of online voting (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). I doubt the policymakers imagined the cyberattack Russian bots launched on social media to influence the 2016 and 2020 elections. A lot has changed since these states implemented the internet voting programs. | |
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< | The push for online voting programs, there were two main concerns: accessibility and voter turnout. For a while accessibility to the ballot was a key topic of discussion of state lawmakers. Unfortunately, it was not out of concern for persons with disabilities. Rather it was because many states were facing lawsuits when voters with disabilities in states like North Carolina and Indian have sued to force “states to expand the pool of voters who are able to return their ballots electronically” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). They argue that the mail-in ballots are not effective and often “leave people behind” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer).
While it is hard to gage the success of online voting in terms of making voting more accessible for persons with disabilities, there has been extensive research on the ineffectiveness of online voting as it pertains to increasing voter turnout. Many proponents of online voting argue that it will increase voter turn, especially among the youth, voters ages 18-29, who prefer internet voting (Digital Politics). Additionally they point to the fact that even with mail-in ballots there are issues such are transit time and voter mistakes on written ballots, that make voting inconvenient and cause their votes to be rejected. The internet, they argue, not only cuts transit time, but reduces the amount of voter mistakes that can lead to rejected ballots (Digital Politics). But what does the data say? The research both nationally and internationally suggests that internet voting increases voter turnout by a nominal 2-3 percent (Digital Politics). Internet voting simply makes voting more convenient for those who would have voted anyway (Digital Politics). Furthermore, young voters' use of the internet has not increased political action like donating to campaigns or sending emails to public officials (Digital Politics). Their voting patterns are likely to mirror this trend.
You have shown no data concerning whether there is actually a significant increase in turnout. Where is the information necessary to support the claim?
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< | Is Internet Voting Here to stay? | >
> | The push for online voting programs, there were two main concerns: accessibility and voter turnout. For a while accessibility to the ballot was a key topic of discussion of state lawmakers. Unfortunately, it was not out of concern for persons with disabilities. Rather it was because many states were facing lawsuits when voters with disabilities in states like North Carolina and Inidian have sued to force “states to expand the pool of voters who are able to return their ballots electronically” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). They argue that the mail-in ballots are not effective and often “leave people behind” (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). | | | | |
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< | In 2020 there were only about 300,000 votes casted online and about 100,000 in the 2022 elections (https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer). As previously mentioned, over 26 states offer an online voting option. Even internationally we are seeing countries like Estonia and Norway have already implemented internet voting in their system. While the numbers are not staggering, there is nothing to suggest that the interest in internet voting is going to decrease. Quite the opposite. With the younger generations still very interested in options, internet voting will continue to be an area of experimentation. | >
> | The data shows that voting is a very difficult process for voters with disabilities. To start, people with disabilities are less likely to vote than people without disabilities (https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/Accessible%20Democracy%20Reducing%20Voting%20Obstacles%20People%20Disabilities.pdf). One reason for this is the fact that “they are discouraged by barriers to getting to or using polling places, which make voting more time-consuming and difficult, and may also decrease feelings of efficacy by sending the message that people with disabilities are not expected to participate in the political sphere” (https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/Accessible%20Democracy%20Reducing%20Voting%20Obstacles%20People%20Disabilities.pdf).
While mail-in ballots increased turnout of voters with disabilities by 6% in 2020, they continue to experience barriers to voting (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/enhancing-accessibility-u-s-elections/). While internet voting has been a popular solutions for states, there are other proposed options to increase voter accessibility. First and foremost, there need to be more updated, and physically accessible polling sites, especially in rural areas. This is perhaps the most expensive option out of them, however, I think, considering the importance of voting to our society (see discussion in Section II) this is well worth the investment. Additionally, election officials should collaborate with advocacy groups and with people with disabilities to hear their concerns, collaborate on solutions, and do outreach on what is currently available. This may include things like “posting audio files with the full text of ballots and instructions on how to mark the ballot (Idaho33), booklets and videos on accessible voting features (Hawaii, North Dakota34), outreach to assisted living facilities (Alaska35), Voter Education Kits provided to individuals at conferences, provider locations, psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, and senior centers (West Virginia36), and radio and television public service announcements in conjunction with disability organizations (New York37)” (https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/Accessible%20Democracy%20Reducing%20Voting%20Obstacles%20People%20Disabilities.pdf). These current efforts are not enough but they are building blocks we can work on to make voting accessible with sacrificing voting integrity. | | |
Conclusion | |
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< | By the end of this process, it became clear that my issue was that I was asking the wrong question. I should have been asking: Are election integrity and election accessibility mutually exclusive? As Coleman and Freelon mention in Digital Politics, “Given that no system is 100% secure, what level of risk can be accepted for such a fundamental democratic process as voting?” | >
> | Overall, I agree with the UC Berkeley Working Group. As of today, it is not feasible to create “responsible standards” for internet voting. The cybersecurity and national security concerns are far too great. The internet is far too vulnerable. I don't know if the internet will ever be secure enough to allow online voting without compromising election integrity. However, this does not mean that our elections are doomed to be inaccessible for voters. Election integrity and voter accessibility are not mutually exclusive. We do not have to sacrifice one for the other. We should instead be looking to improve the ways of making polling stations, poll workers, and the physical ballots themselves more accessible. W should also look towards investing technology, independent of the internet, to make this possible. | | |
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