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< < | -- MikeAbend - 18 Oct 2011
“Introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through well-established distribution mechanisms.” | > > | "Introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through well-established distribution mechanisms." | | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) | |
< < | In 1964, Marshall McLuhan? published Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man and popularized the quote “the medium is the message”. McLuhan? recognized an ever-present symbiotic relationship between creative content and technology, noting that the medium of delivery to the consumer often defines the content itself. In this vein, the medium of consumption, rather than the content, is most important in developing and studying business models and the legal compensation mechanisms in the media industry.
With the invention of the sound recording, music changed from an experience that could only be heard live (or on the radio) to a commodity that could be owned. Consider that in 1910, prior to the creation of sound recordings, 374,000 pianos were manufactured in the US for use in the home—by 1984, the number was 206,000 (pianos were the only way to create music “on demand”). The commoditization of sound recordings provided a limited amount of content to the purchaser, who could then listen to it at his or her convenience. Since records were relatively expensive and entailed a high marginal cost for those with limited resources, consumers selected small amounts of music to own based on personal taste and the promotional reach of each artist.
The “record” defined the business model of the music industry, which consolidated to form four major multinational profit-maximizing corporate record labels that collectively owned over 80% of sound recording copyrights and accounted for more than 77% of all retail music sales by 1998. These labels also owned ancillary businesses such as the distribution network to reap huge profits. The music industry thrived under this system until the late 1990’s, when technology destroyed institutional control and made established revenue streams obsolete (practically overnight). | > > | In 1964, Marshall McLuhan published Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man and popularized the quote "the medium is the message." McLuhan recognized an ever-present symbiotic relationship between creative content and technology, noting that the medium of delivery to the consumer often defines the content itself. In this vein, the medium of consumption, rather than the content, is most important in developing and studying business models and the legal compensation mechanisms in the media industry. | | | |
< < | These three technologies, 1) p2p file sharing (distribution); 2) MP3 compression; and 3) increased storage capacity (the iPod and other similar devices) had a profound impact on the way consumers interacted with music. Previous generations had viewed music as a commodity to be bought at a store, as one would buy a car or furniture. With “free”, albeit illegal, access to an infinite digital library, modern consumers began to accumulate huge collections of previously inaccessible or prohibitively expensive music from a wide variety of artists. Importantly, consumers would have never bought the music from many of these artists in the form of a CD. | > > | McLuhan added nothing here but a toney quotation: it's exactly the point Woody Allen was making in the movie. Why not drop it and use the space for something of your own? | | | |
< < | As sociological expectations changed and consumers began to expect to hear any song on demand, music shifted from something acquired to something accessed. No longer were consumers forced to savor an unowned song as one would savor a sunset without a camera—-new technology (especially the advances in mobile telephony and storage capacity) fundamentally changed the entire business model, but record labels stubbornly refused to accept the new media landscape, especially facing the diminishing importance of their control over the business. As noted by the EU Commission, "[[http://www.mediafuturist.com/2009/07/i-love-spotify-but.html][The failed music industry business model is [caused] online piracy]]”. | > > | With the invention of the sound recording, music changed from an experience that could only be heard live (or on the radio) to a commodity that could be owned. Consider that in 1910, prior to the creation of sound recordings, 374,000 pianos were manufactured in the US for use in the home—by 1984, the number was 206,000 (pianos were the only way to create music "on demand"). | | | |
< < | While online piracy ran rampant through the 2000’s, the record labels frantically tried to retain their control over all aspects of music from studio to (digital) shelf. They created their own online stores; licensed catalogs with incredibly burdensome DRM technology; and viciously prosecuted their former consumers for file sharing, but ultimately none of these strategies sated the growing consumer thirst for (illegal) universal music access. | > > | No, not the only way.
It would be correct to say that there were many cheaper substitutes
for pianos in both the 19th and 20th centuries. People didn't buy
pianos because they couldn't afford pennywhistles. The piano was
precisely the wasteful sign of middle-class existence. Once again,
Thorstein Veblen is the economist you need
here.
The commoditization of sound recordings provided a limited amount of content to the purchaser, who could then listen to it at his or her convenience. Since records were relatively expensive and entailed a high marginal cost for those with limited resources, consumers selected small amounts of music to own based on personal taste and the promotional reach of each artist.
That's a pretty crabbed
view of how people consumed recordings in the 20th century. It's not
either right or wrong, just completely reductive and riddled with
exceptions. If anything in the argument depends on the completeness
of that account, let alone the whole of the argument, you made it
up.
The "record" defined the business model of the music industry, which consolidated to form four major multinational profit-maximizing corporate record labels that collectively owned over 80% of sound recording copyrights and accounted for more than 77% of all retail music sales by 1998. These labels also owned ancillary businesses such as the distribution network to reap huge profits. The music industry thrived under this system until the late 1990's, when technology destroyed institutional control and made established revenue streams obsolete (practically overnight).
You're forgetting the
previous technology transfers (from single to LP, from mono to
stereo, from vinyl to tape) which had previously destroyed
institutional control and made established revenue streams obsolete
practically overnight.
These three technologies, 1) p2p file sharing (distribution); 2) MP3 compression; and 3) increased storage capacity (the iPod and other similar devices) had a profound impact on the way consumers interacted with music. Previous generations had viewed music as a commodity to be bought at a store, as one would buy a car or furniture.
Well, 1.5 generations
more or less. Previous generations (probably several thousand of them
at least, back to before the development of modern spoken language)
had regarded music as something people make together. Would you
regard that as a point worth commenting on, or is only the experience
of the previous 1.46+/-0.27 generations relevant?
With "free", albeit illegal, access to an infinite digital library, modern consumers began to accumulate huge collections of previously inaccessible or prohibitively expensive music from a wide variety of artists. Importantly, consumers would have never bought the music from many of these artists in the form of a CD.
How do you know this?
Market survey data repeatedly showed that people who shared music
online also bought more CDs than non-sharers. No doubt there were
many people (certainly I was one) who expanded very much my
purchasing of CDs once I could rip my own and increase the utility of
the music I purchased, and then expanded purchasing further once the
catalogs of the companies began to be more broadly available at lower
prices. I never acquired music without paying the license charges,
whatever I then did with the music I had licensed as well as
purchased fixed in a tangible medium. Music collectors have never
disappeared, and I can't imagine why collectors would suddenly stop
paying to encourage the production of what they love. Their
collections are more useful to humanity than they used to be. I at
least don't see how that either corresponds to your account of the
situation, or to a problem requiring solution.
As sociological expectations changed and consumers began to expect to hear any song on demand, music shifted from something acquired to something accessed. No longer were consumers forced to savor an unowned song as one would savor a sunset without a camera—-new technology (especially the advances in mobile telephony and storage capacity) fundamentally changed the entire business model, but record labels stubbornly refused to accept the new media landscape, especially facing the diminishing importance of their control over the business. As noted by the EU Commission, "The failed music industry business model causes online piracy."
Not noted by the
European Commission. Said by one commissioner, Viviane Reding, once.
It isn't true because she said it, and I see no reason given here to
agree that it is true at all. "Piracy" here might mean all sorts of
things, but if the proposition is supposed to mean that sharing
occurs because capitalists haven't figured out how to replace it with
inexpensive nonsharable property the sharers don't own, I think it's
total nonsense for which no evidence whatever is available.
While online piracy ran rampant through the 2000's, the record labels frantically tried to retain their control over all aspects of music from studio to (digital) shelf. They created their own online stores; licensed catalogs with incredibly burdensome DRM technology; and viciously prosecuted their former consumers for file sharing, but ultimately none of these strategies sated the growing consumer thirst for (illegal) universal music access.
Recently, the growth of "streaming" technologies has provided a new monetizable distribution mechanism for the universal access business model. Consumers are now able to access any song wherever their phone has a wireless connection, making the "celestial jukebox" a reality, but labels continue to exert unnecessary control over music consumption.
Besides, those services
are totally irrelevant, because the bulk of music is now shared by
people directly, without the slightest control of any kind, and the
whole "streaming service" market represents the tiniest sliver of
nothing compared to the music industry the music industry was going
to build, in which the goods cost nothing and they were paid for
every time they were consumed, which was their idea of the future
until reality set in. That's the actual story. Why are you trying
to tell this one, which is almost 99.44% pure bullshit promotion for
streaming companies who have no future offering very low speed
downloads of unprotected data files people can get quickly from
thousands of other places?
The labels' "control" is a function of the IP protection schemes that have evolved over the years. Most copyright legislation is not the result of some well thought out plan, but instead a sort of compromise with the content industries. "Streaming" IP rights, found in §114 of the copyright act, provide an illustrative example of how the record labels abuse their market position in a concentrated industry.
Any OnDemand? service such as Grooveshark or Spotify needs to attain blanket licenses to each major label's entire catalog to make their service competitive. Without one of the major labels' permission, the service will not be able to offer "universal" access and faces a competitive disadvantage. Recognizing their superior bargaining power, the labels have abused their position to the detriment of new, innovative companies. When the interactive service Sonific closed in 2008, CEO and co-founder Gerd Leonherd blamed the intransigence of the record labels in licensing their catalogs as the main reason for the company's failure:
Which really meant, of
course, that he thought that they should be forced to distribute
through him at a government-guaranteed price so that he could pretend
to consumers that they couldn't reshare the music they were getting
from him, thus apparently opening yet another hole in the companies'
balloon for the benefit of every conman other than themselves. Now
he's the apostle of compulsory licensing in France as HADOPI proves
itself to be the unworkable piece of shit the Free World said it was,
as the industry's last bulwark before the transition to freedom, so
he can get his piece of the garbage as it decays. None of this means
absolutely anything. Music is reverting to freedom, over a period
lasting in total less than fifty years, of which we are now about
twenty in. The recording business is playing out time, trying to
look lively, but it is walking dead now. I know there has to be a
course for one hopelessly lost law professor and one hopelessly lost
business school professor to spend time on the short-term
oscillations before it falls over: from a B-school perspective that's
even a useful activity. But it's an absolute guarantee of
intellectual aridity to be spending too much time worrying about the
particular convulsions in the death throes. | | | |
< < | Recently, the growth of “streaming” technologies has provided a new monetizable distribution mechanism for the universal access business model. Consumers are now able to access any song wherever their phone has a wireless connection, making the “celestial jukebox” a reality, but labels continue to exert unnecessary control over music consumption.
The labels’ “control” is a function of the IP protection schemes that have evolved over the years. Most copyright legislation is not the result of some well thought out plan, but instead a sort of compromise with the content industries. “Streaming” IP rights, found in §114 of the copyright act, provide an illustrative example of how the record labels abuse their market position in a concentrated industry.
Any OnDemand? service such as Grooveshark or Spotify needs to attain blanket licenses to each major label’s entire catalog to make their service competitive. Without one of the major labels’ permission, the service will not be able to offer “universal” access and faces a competitive disadvantage. Recognizing their superior bargaining power, the labels have abused their position to the detriment of new, innovative companies. When the interactive service Sonific closed in 2008, CEO and co-founder Gerd Leonherd blamed the intransigence of the record labels in licensing their catalogs as the main reason for the company’s failure:
There are countless startups providing access to any and all music streams without any license whatsoever. However, when we approached the major record label decision makers in order to obtain licenses for some of the music in their catalogs we have routinely faced demands for very large cash advances and fixed per-stream minimum payments, pressure to give them ‘free’ company equity, and requirements of utterly bizarre usage restrictions. It seems that the industry’s major stakeholders still prefer this turf to remain unlicensed rather than to allow real-life, workable and market-based solutions to emerge by working with new companies such as Sonific. | > > | There are countless startups providing access to any and all music streams without any license whatsoever. However, when we approached the major record label decision makers in order to obtain licenses for some of the music in their catalogs we have routinely faced demands for very large cash advances and fixed per-stream minimum payments, pressure to give them 'free' company equity, and requirements of utterly bizarre usage restrictions. It seems that the industry's major stakeholders still prefer this turf to remain unlicensed rather than to allow real-life, workable and market-based solutions to emerge by working with new companies such as Sonific. | | For the companies that have managed to secure licenses, the terms are far from fair. Not only have the labels reportedly taken an equity stake in these companies, the compensation paid to non-major (independent) labels is substantially less, meaning an artist will make less money if they are not signed to a major. In addition, many artists are hugely undercompensated for their popularity on these services, while the labels get paid twice (royalties in addition to their equity stakes). Not until the labels are forced to provide their catalogs at a reasonable price will consumers truly benefit. | |
> > | -- MikeAbend - 18 Oct 2011 | | | |
> > | The essay is coherent as
long as it doesn't have to be more than a complaint that the industry
isn't surrendering. I would like it to be more than that,
particularly inasmuch as I don't think their surrender is even
slightly necessary, the completion of their ruin being already
evident. But even were I to believe, as you seem to be trying feebly
to convince me, that there is something happening that can be
compared meaningfully to the sharing economy in music all around us
that could rescue "ownership" as a basis for distribution, I still
wouldn't be inclined to accept the notion that someone has discretion
or reason to require the so-called owners to give away their supposed
property at state-created prices to a new class of favored middlemen.
If the supposed owners own anything, there's no basis whatever to
make them surrender their ownership to a younger class of thugs. If
they don't own anything, no one else does either, and we are free to
share, thus achieving everybody's supposedly desired result
immediately, without need for another bunch of corrupt and disgusting
bottleneckers. | | | | | |
< < | -- MatthewLadner - 27 Oct 2011 | > > | -- MatthewLadner - 27 Oct 2011+++ |
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