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Why do I study patent law? | | | On the viability of the use of State Force as an incentive to innovation
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< | Irrespective of the origin and nature of innovation, it still seems a fair proposition to state that there should be some form of motivation to create such innovation. All human activity is conducted out of fundamental human motivation, whether for sustenance and survival or towards the satisfaction of a relatively abstract (but nonetheless, equally fundamental) impetus, whether power, approval or the creative impulse. However, it has never, until the post-industrial era, been a fundamental supposition that all these motivations may be satisfied by the provision of economic benefits. Given, that monetary valuation has been rapidly accepted as the default for all goods and services, it may seem logical that this valuation be extended to innovation as well. Hence, the monopoly over patented inventions, granting the inventor the opportunity to realise economic value from his creation. However, this assumption misunderstands the impetus for human innovation and distorts the process of innovation itself. The inventor invents or creates in response to a perceived need to do so, which, as stated earlier, may arise from a multiplicity of compulsions. The patent system assumes that the promotion of those compulsions is equivalent to their monetization, and therefore boils them down into (indirect) monetary incentive. Upon completion or during the process of such creation, he searches for means to monetize his creation. In most situations, the inventor prefers not to use the patent system at all, and to utilise alternatives, some of which may exclude the possibility of the patent system (for more information on this, see p.3 of the linked .pdf). The patent system does not motivate the inventor to create, but to exclude others from access to this creation. It is essentially the provision of a license to a person from the State, granting the person the power to utilise the force and authority of the State in order to prevent others from utilising his invention in an unauthorised manner. There is no dearth of examples of situations outside the patent system where entities, granted the authority of the State, utilise this authority towards their own ends, whether they be in conformity with the intentions of the State or not. In the case of the patent regime this authority is exploited, not by those seeking to protect their creations, but by those seeking to strategically exclude the possibility of legitimate improvements or modifications upon these creations. This results in the creation of the 'patent paradox', a situation where the effectiveness of patenting as a means of protecting real research has declined, though the number of patents secured has increased. For this reason, it may be argued that a system dependent on economic exclusion combined with political and legal enforcement, such as the patent system, does not promote innovation at all, and serves, rather, to retard true innovation. | >
> | Irrespective of the origin and nature of innovation, it still seems a fair proposition to state that there should be some form of motivation to create such innovation. All human activity is conducted out of fundamental human motivation, whether for sustenance and survival or towards the satisfaction of a relatively abstract (but nonetheless, equally fundamental) impetus, whether power, approval or the creative impulse. However, it has never, until the post-industrial era, been a fundamental supposition that all these motivations may be satisfied by the provision of economic benefits. Given, that monetary valuation has been rapidly accepted as the default for all goods and services, it may seem logical that this valuation be extended to innovation as well. Hence, the monopoly over patented inventions, granting the inventor the opportunity to realise economic value from his creation. However, this assumption misunderstands the impetus for human innovation and distorts the process of innovation itself. The inventor invents or creates in response to a perceived need to do so, which, as stated earlier, may arise from a multiplicity of compulsions. The patent system assumes that the promotion of those compulsions is equivalent to their monetization, and therefore boils them down into (indirect) monetary incentive. Upon completion or during the process of such creation, he searches for means to monetize his creation. In most situations, the inventor prefers not to use the patent system at all, and to utilise alternatives, some of which may exclude the possibility of the patent system. The patent system does not motivate the inventor to create, but to exclude others from access to this creation. It is essentially the provision of a license to a person from the State, granting the person the power to utilise the force and authority of the State in order to prevent others from utilising his invention in an unauthorised manner. In the case of the patent regime this power is exploited, not by those seeking to protect their creations, but by those seeking to strategically exclude the possibility of legitimate improvements or modifications upon these creations. This results in the creation of the 'patent paradox', a situation where the effectiveness of patenting as a means of protecting real research has declined, though the number of patents secured has increased. For this reason, it may be argued that a system dependent on economic exclusion combined with political and legal enforcement, such as the patent system, does not promote innovation at all, and serves, rather, to retard true innovation. | | |
The Integration of the Patent System into Current Technological Development |
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