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Why do I study patent law? | | | On the viability of the use of State Force as an incentive to innovation
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< | Irrespective of the origin and nature of innovation, it still seems a fair proposition to state that there should be some form of motivation to create such innovation. All human activity is conducted out of fundamental human motivation, whether for sustenance and survival or towards the satisfaction of a relatively abstract (but nonetheless, equally fundamental) impetus, whether power, approval or the creative impulse. However, it has never, until the post-industrial era, been a fundamental supposition that all these motivations may be satisfied by the provision of economic benefits. Given, that monetary valuation has been rapidly accepted as the default for all goods and services, it may seem logical that this valuation be extended to innovation as well. Hence, the monopoly over patented inventions, granting the inventor the opportunity to realise economic value from his creation. However, this assumption misunderstands the impetus for human innovation and distorts the process of innovation itself. The inventor invents or creates in response to a perceived need to do so. Upon completion or during the process of such creation, he searches for means to monetize his creation. Amongst different means of monetization, he is presented with the option of the patent system, to which the alternatives are trade secret protection, lead time in production and the provision of complementary services. In most situations, the inventor prefers not to use the patent system at all, and to utilise these alternatives instead, some of which may exclude the patent system (for more information on this, see p.3 of the linked .pdf). The patent system does not motivate the inventor to create, but to exclude others from access to this creation. It is essentially the provision of a license to a person from the State, granting the person the power to utilise the force and authority of the State in order to prevent others from utilising his invention in an unauthorised manner. There is no dearth of examples of situations outside the patent system where entities, granted the authority of the State, utilise this authority towards their own ends, whether they be in conformity with the intentions of the State or not. In the case of the patent regime this authority is exploited, not by those seeking to protect their creations, but by those seeking to strategically exclude the possibility of legitimate improvements or modifications upon these creations. This results in the creation of the 'patent paradox', a situation where the effectiveness of patenting as a means of protecting real research has declined, though the number of patents secured has increased. For this reason, it may be argued that a system dependent on economic exclusion combined with political and legal enforcement, such as the patent system, does not promote innovation at all, and serves, rather, to retard true innovation. | >
> | Irrespective of the origin and nature of innovation, it still seems a fair proposition to state that there should be some form of motivation to create such innovation. All human activity is conducted out of fundamental human motivation, whether for sustenance and survival or towards the satisfaction of a relatively abstract (but nonetheless, equally fundamental) impetus, whether power, approval or the creative impulse. However, it has never, until the post-industrial era, been a fundamental supposition that all these motivations may be satisfied by the provision of economic benefits. Given, that monetary valuation has been rapidly accepted as the default for all goods and services, it may seem logical that this valuation be extended to innovation as well. Hence, the monopoly over patented inventions, granting the inventor the opportunity to realise economic value from his creation. However, this assumption misunderstands the impetus for human innovation and distorts the process of innovation itself. The inventor invents or creates in response to a perceived need to do so, which, as stated earlier, may arise from a multiplicity of compulsions. The patent system assumes that the promotion of those compulsions is equivalent to their monetization, and therefore boils them down into (indirect) monetary incentive. Upon completion or during the process of such creation, he searches for means to monetize his creation. In most situations, the inventor prefers not to use the patent system at all, and to utilise alternatives, some of which may exclude the possibility of the patent system (for more information on this, see p.3 of the linked .pdf). The patent system does not motivate the inventor to create, but to exclude others from access to this creation. It is essentially the provision of a license to a person from the State, granting the person the power to utilise the force and authority of the State in order to prevent others from utilising his invention in an unauthorised manner. There is no dearth of examples of situations outside the patent system where entities, granted the authority of the State, utilise this authority towards their own ends, whether they be in conformity with the intentions of the State or not. In the case of the patent regime this authority is exploited, not by those seeking to protect their creations, but by those seeking to strategically exclude the possibility of legitimate improvements or modifications upon these creations. This results in the creation of the 'patent paradox', a situation where the effectiveness of patenting as a means of protecting real research has declined, though the number of patents secured has increased. For this reason, it may be argued that a system dependent on economic exclusion combined with political and legal enforcement, such as the patent system, does not promote innovation at all, and serves, rather, to retard true innovation. | | |
The Integration of the Patent System into Current Technological Development | |
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< | Given the fundamental flaws within the patent system, its fair to wonder why the patent system exists at all today, and whether there exists a viable alternative to patenting as a means for incentivising innovation. As I have already noted earlier, innovation is (usually) not the result of individual effort. It results from the efforts of a collective, whether the collective is represented by the State or a corporation. The reason for this is that collectives are able to organise and invest the financial, human and time-related resources required in order to create the innovation required in a rapidly technologically advancing world. This is no less true today than it was in the Industrial era. However, the problem inherent in the collective lies in its insular character, and its motivation for the furtherance of its own interests. If this collective is a State, then these interests may be beneficial to the citizens of that State, but not so much for others. If it is a corporation, these interests are beneficial to its shareholders, and probably not to others. The patent system was created and perpetuated in order to foster these interests, and the rules of exclusion and enforcement created therein support and feed this model of innovation. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible... to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. The way I see it, this statement speaks not to the inherent benefits of the patent system, but to its integration into our current system of industrial and technological organisation. To arbitrarily remove this system would be to bring the existing machineries of technological and industrial development crashing down. Assuming that this is a bad result, what remains that can be done? The only way to remove reliance on such an edifice is to provide an alternative form of collective dependent on an alternative system of innovation incentivisation. How does one create such a collective out of thin air? The answer to this question is that such alternatives exist today, and are being implemented. In some industry areas, the 'alternative' is an established means of creating and fostering innovation. In others, it remains in its nascent stages, but with much potential for the future. This alternative consists of the system of networked innovation. | >
> | Given the fundamental flaws within the patent system, its fair to wonder why the patent system exists at all today, and whether there exists a viable alternative to patenting as a means for incentivising innovation. As I have already noted earlier, innovation is (usually) not the result of individual effort. It results from the efforts of a collective, whether the collective is represented by the State or a corporation. The reason for this is that collectives are able to organise and invest the financial, human and time-related resources required in order to create the innovation required in a rapidly technologically advancing world. This is no less true today than it was in the Industrial era. However, the problem inherent in the corporate collective lies in the insularity of its motivations, the furtherance of its own interest, whether beneficial to the citizens of that State, or to the shareholders of a company. The patent system was created and perpetuated in order to foster these interests, and the rules of exclusion and enforcement created therein support and feed this model of innovation. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible... to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. The previous statement speaks to me, not of the inherent benefits of the patent system, but to its integration into our current system of industrial and technological organisation, the removal of the former resulting in the sudden death of the latter, with no alternative to stand-in. Assuming that this is a bad result, what remains that can be done? The only way to remove reliance on such an edifice is to provide an alternative form of collective dependent on an alternative system of innovation incentivisation. How does one create such a collective out of thin air? The answer to this question is that such alternatives exist today, as established means of creating and fostering innovation in some industries and in its nascent stages, but with much potential for the future, in others. This alternative consists of the system of networked innovation. | | |
Networked Innovation: Creating the new collective | |
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< | Networked innovation is a system of innovation by which the financial, human and time-related resources required for innovation are provided, not by a single organised entity, but by an aggregation of entities, the identities of which may constantly change. The creation, development and improvement of knowledge is conducted in increments, with each increment provided and improved by different entities over time. Incentive for creation may lie in approval and/or monetary benefit in the form of grants or payment for value-added services. The end-result is the creation of knowledge through a non-insular collective, resulting in products that have behind them resource-allocation equal to or greater than a large corporation. However, no one entity within the collective has invested the quantity of resources that demands massive profit-maximisation as a result of such investment. These results are achievable today, to varying degrees in different industries. They are evident today in software-related fields, from browser development to knowledge database creation to operating systems. They are yet to significantly impact other industry areas but networked innovation exists in areas such as biotechnology and automobile design. Completed products of this system of organisation and incentivisation of innovation have been capable of competing effectively with equivalent products created by the corporate innovation system. Some of these systems are more proprietary than others but none of them so far utilise the exclusionary powers encouraged by the patent regime. Given the proven effectiveness of this system and its rapid rate of growth, it is a matter of time before the networked innovation collective emerges as a viable alternative to, and eventually, a replacement for corporate innovation. Assuming that the products of this system will largely operate outside of the patent system, the system itself will become increasingly redundant, the rate of its redundancy directly proportionate to the rate of decline of corporate innovation. | >
> | Networked innovation is a system of innovation by which the financial, human and time-related resources required for innovation are provided, not by a single, organised entity, but by an aggregation of entities, the identities of which may constantly change. The creation, development and improvement of knowledge is conducted in increments, with each increment provided and improved by different entities over time. Incentive for creation may lie in approval and/or monetary benefit in the form of grants or payment for value-added services. The end-result is the creation of knowledge through a non-insular collective, resulting in products that have behind them resource-allocation equal to or greater than a large corporation. However, no one entity within the collective has invested the quantity of resources that demands massive profit-maximisation as a result of such investment. These results are achievable today, to varying degrees in different industries. They are evident today in software-related fields, from browser development to knowledge database creation to operating systems. They are yet to significantly impact other industry areas but networked innovation exists in areas such as biotechnology and automobile design. Completed products of this system of organisation and incentivisation of innovation have been capable of competing effectively with equivalent products created by the corporate innovation system. Some of these systems are more proprietary than others but none of them so far utilise the exclusionary powers encouraged by the patent regime. Given the proven effectiveness of this system and its rapid rate of growth, it is a matter of time before the networked innovation collective emerges as a viable alternative to, and eventually, a replacement for corporate innovation. Assuming that the products of this system will largely operate outside of the patent system, the system itself will become increasingly redundant, the rate of its redundancy directly proportionate to the rate of decline of corporate innovation. | | |
So why do I study patent law? |
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