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< | Can the trolls be stopped? The Philippines as “patient zero” |
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> | Trolls and the middle ground: Middleware as an option in the Philippines? |
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< | -- By SamanthaBeatriceKing - 22 Oct 2021 |
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> | -- By SamanthaBeatriceKing - 06 Jan 2022 |
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< | From trolling to troll farming |
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> | Introduction |
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< | Trolling as an internet term harks back to the late 80s-early 90s, when users in online forums would “troll” newbies by baiting them into discussions. Generally, “trolls” refer to a subgroup of online communities who create offensive posts to elicit reactions. |
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> | In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippine presidency on a social media campaign carried by trolls. Afterwards, Duterte promptly appointed bloggers and social media influencers acting as trolls to government positions. With the next presidential elections in 2022, the use of trolls shows no signs of slowing down. |
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< | Fast forward to around 2014, and the idea of Russian “troll farms” began to enter the public consciousness. Troll farms are an organized breed of online agitators, spreading misinformation and sowing discord on a mass scale. The use of troll farms notably gained traction in the 2016 presidential elections—both in the United States and in the Philippines. A Russian troll factory was accused of trying to disrupt the US elections; spreading pro-Trump propaganda and fake news to voters. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte won the elections on a social media campaign carried and defended by trolls. |
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> | In the first place, trolls have found traction because of the platform itself. The root cause is Facebook’s algorithms. Online trolls, who maximize usage by generating thousands of posts and comments on a divisive topic, benefit from these algorithms. Ultimately, Facebook’s algorithms do not distinguish between fact and fiction; it decides what users see on their feed. |
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< | Since then, the Philippines was branded “patient zero in the global disinformation epidemic.” With the next presidential elections to take place in 2022, it’s alarming that the use of troll farms shows no signs of slowing down. |
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> | When you have a head of state so willing to utilize (or weaponize) trolls, a developing country with a young, social media-savvy population, and a technology platform notorious for exploiting divisiveness—what can be done? |
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< | Trolls as normalized in the Philippines? |
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> | Nobel Prize winner Maria Ressa, a longtime target of pro-Duterte trolls, has called for “emergency intervention” in social media. Specifically, Ressa has mentioned the need for legislation as a first step. |
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< | The Philippines has fully embraced the troll machinery. Where troll farms were traditionally state-sponsored, the Philippines has turned social media manipulation into an industry. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Presidential Communications Operations Office have hired “social media specialists” under public contracts approved by the Department of Finance. These so-called specialists are suspected to be trolls. Individual politicians, celebrities, and businesses alike have availed of the covert trolling services peddled by public relations firms. What’s more, Philippine public relations practitioners want to go global with the trolling: they imagine the Philippines as a center where foreign political and corporate entities can hire a troll army. As a poor country with a young, English-speaking, social media-savvy population, there is easy money in this endeavor. |
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> | The next question concerns the form that this legislation should take. |
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< | The concept of trolling has also evolved to include “positive” or “white” trolls, meant to serve as a foil to the black trolls. White trolls supposedly influence people in a “proper” way by refraining from using hate speech, fake news, and copy-paste tactics, among others. Philippine “social media specialists” wield the white troll banner against the operations of black trolls. When it comes down to it, however, white troll social media accounts are still comprised of fabricated names and backgrounds. |
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> | Drawing from Francis Fukuyama’s concept of “middleware,” this essay briefly examines the feasibility of mandating middleware use in the Philippines; the drawbacks of requiring the use of such software; and possible alternatives. |
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< | The danger to democracy |
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< | Is it the troll themselves that pose a danger to democracy, or the platforms that allow them to operate in the first place? Can we count on the big technology companies to police themselves? Or should we rely on government regulation? What if the government itself is complicit to the propaganda and online attacks? |
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> | Middleware as content curator |
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< | There are no easy answers to these questions. Among others, a flourishing democracy requires intellectual freedom, participatory politics, and a foundation of truth. Trolling threatens democracy by the spread of disinformation and discord. It is antithesis to free speech in this sense. And this is compounded by the algorithms on social media. Facebook’s custom-tailored algorithms tend to feed into its users’ biases, showing content that echoes their views or confirms their fears. Troll farms, which have the capacity to generate thousands of posts and comments on a divisive topic, only benefit from these algorithms. |
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> | To deconsolidate power from Facebook and similar platforms, Fukuyama proposes outsourcing content curation to a competitive layer of “middleware companies.” Middleware is software that rides on top of an existing internet or social media platform that can tweak how the underlying data is presented to users. For example, such middleware service could flag misleading posts, rate the credibility of news sources, or block certain content. The goal is to subvert the platform’s algorithms by giving users control over the material they see. Middleware will not eradicate fake news, but the hope is that it will prevent Facebook’s algorithms from artificially enlarging such news by content filtering. |
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< | Call to arms against fake news and trolls |
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> | Legislation and middleware |
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< | In the Philippines, Facebook has partnered with third-party fact-checking organizations to fight the spread of disinformation. However, the fact-checking is limited to public posts, and does not extend to opinion and speech from politicians. Facebook explains that politicians are not eligible for fact-checking because of the company’s “fundamental belief in free expression.” The company claims that limiting political speech would leave people less informed and the officials less accountable. But, again, what if the elected officials themselves are the ones peddling disinformation?
While Facebook may be taking steps to moderate content, it could surely do more to curb the proliferation of trolls. One simple way to do this would be the requirement of legitimate identification before allowing users to sign up. This would greatly quell the flood of fake accounts on the platform and perhaps affect the spread of disinformation. |
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> | Despite consistently ranking first in social media usage, the Philippines has no law regulating social media and the proliferation of fake news. In contrast, neighboring countries like Vietnam and Indonesia have enacted regulations forcing technology companies to store information on local servers, and provides for sweeping notice and takedown orders, among others. The problem from this end is the serious threat to free speech. |
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< | There are some who espouse using white trolling methods to fight fire with fire. As trolls themselves, these cyber vigilantes would create scores of accounts to counter the narrative of black trolls through “proper” logic and reasoning. But this is a short-term solution which only feeds into the algorithm; boosting the post or comment and possibly creating more discord. |
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> | Middleware is supposedly the middle ground. To sidestep the problem of government controlling online content and suppressing free speech, the idea is that these platforms should be required to give their users the option to filter their content with middleware. |
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< | Despite the hand of government in the spread of troll farms, there is no denying that state regulation should come into play. For instance, the Philippines does not have any laws which criminalizes fake news. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, while criticized by the Human Rights Watch as “overbroad censorship,” is a possible starting point for the Philippines. |
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> | Since freedom of expression is constitutionally protected in the Philippines, Congress theoretically cannot pass any law preventing, much less prosecuting, people from posting misleading opinions or “fake news.” |
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< | Francis Fukuyama proposes the use of middleware to deconsolidate power from the hands of Facebook and its like. Again, Congress can provide a push for middleware companies by passing laws which mandate the use of middleware in social media. Platform users would be effectively holding the reins of what they see when they scroll down. |
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> | To rein in fake news and the troll farms amplifying such content, Congress may, in theory, require Facebook to interconnect with middleware as a condition to continue operations in the Philippines. Similar to the UK’s Online Harms Bill, Congress can impose on social media platforms operating in the country a “duty of care” to protect users from harmful content. Among the ways this “duty of care” can be operationalized is precisely by requiring these companies to open their systems to middleware. |
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< | Ultimately, it would take the joint, collaborative efforts of big tech companies, government, and civil society, to quell the power of troll farms. |
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> | And while the idea is that this middleware should be chosen by consumers, it is unlikely that Filipinos will want to spend on middleware to moderate their feeds. One possibility is that the government itself procure middleware software through competitive bidding, and then mandate users to install the same. Considering the likelihood of state abuse, however, this is not an ideal scenario. Congress may open the market in any case, providing tax incentives for middleware providers to come forward and apply for accreditation before offering their services to the public. |
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The way to make this essay better is to put your ideas front and center. The facts you set out here have been written about very widely, and for those of your readers who don't know about the particulars of the Philippine situation you can present everything you need (and I'm not sure what you do need) in a paragraph. It's surprising to read a draft on that subject which does mention Francis Fukuyama—who knows nothing—and not Maria Ressa, who does. (Fukuyama's "middleware" is what I spoke about in Freedom in the Cloud, which I assigned more than a decade before he got around to misdescribing it, by which time the late Jim Dwyer's book "More Awesome Than Money" had already described what happened once I did. Requiring people to use software government likes doesn't seem like a very good idea to me, but you don't actually analyze the suggestion, because you have only left yourself a paragraph in which to do so at the tail end of a draft choking on fact. Put your idea up front. Show briefly how you came by it, trying to take a global perspective if you can. Analyze the workings of tech, politics and law in relation to your idea. Give the reader a conclusion that is also a jumping-off point for her own thinking. Then you will have a really excellent next draft.
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> | The private sector can also chip in—media outlets, internet service providers, or independent organizations could offer or sponsor middleware services for users. The Philippine government can, in turn, incentivize these private players with tax benefits. |
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> | Inherent flaws and possible alternatives |
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< | Sources: |
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> | Of course, reality is always more complicated. Despite my lack of knowledge, I can see that the middleware proposal is difficult to execute, practically and logistically. Even if Congress finds the political will, Duterte can simply exercise his veto powers. After all, his administration benefits the most from the use of trolls. And assuming Philippine legislation opens such a market, will there even be middleware providers that have the capacity to filter the massive amounts of data from Facebook and the like? What would be their standards for ranking, labeling, and diluting content? |
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Why aren't these links placed in the text? You are writing for the Web, so use it as intended and make things easy for the reader, please.
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> | On a more fundamental level, there is no way to ensure social media users will filter their feed with credible news sources. It is more likely that users would choose options that strongly resembles their own biases, thereby perpetuating, on a lesser scale, the ills sought to be regulated in the first place.
Perhaps instead of indirectly regulating social media platforms through middleware, the Philippines could follow the example of the UK and EU in requiring the platforms themselves to take responsibility for user safety. In lieu of relying on middleware providers to dilute Facebook’s algorithms, for instance, Congress can require tech companies “to have appropriate systems and processes in place to tackle harmful content and activity.” If Facebook fails to remove such harmful content, it could face fines or be blocked from operating in the Philippines.
Though this idea appears simpler without a third-party provider, it is its own Pandora’s Box. Should Facebook be given even more power by allowing it to define, and act upon, “harmful” content? Where does the line cross into censorship? What about the users’ agency?
Middleware is an imperfect, surface-level remedy. At this time, however, it may be the most palatable proposal in the Philippine context. Whatever the case, three things remain indispensable: strong regulatory intervention, the cooperation of big tech, and the vigilance of civil society. |
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< | https://www.theguardian.com/media/mind-your-language/2012/apr/19/trolls-where-come-from
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/02/16/robert-mueller-investigation-what-russian-troll-farm/346159002/
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/5/pdf/2005-deepportal2-troll-factories.pdf
https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-troll-farm-spent-millions-on-election-interference-2018-2
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-38173842
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-11-19/troll-armies-routine-in-philippine-politics-coming-here-next
https://influenceonline.co.uk/2019/07/27/the-billion-dollars-business-of-social-media-trolling-in-the-philippines-and-what-it-means-for-public-relations-globally/
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/07/12/2111990/government-funded-troll-farms-senators-want-closer-look
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-crafty-internet-trolls-in-the-philippines-may-be-coming-to-a-website-near-you/2019/07/25/c5d42ee2-5c53-11e9-
98d4-844088d135f2_story.html
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/315131736305613?id=673052479947730
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-technology |
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