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Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones


SpencerWanFirstPaper 7 - 13 Apr 2012 - Main.SpencerWan
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Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones in the 21st Century

Are you saying that you're not trying to write about the state of the law 88 years from now, in the 22nd century? Or distinguishing the situation from the 20th century, when there were no smartphones anyway? How about just "Warrantless Searches of Smartphones"?
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Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones

 -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011
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With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society,

Is there a society we don't use everyday? Is technology innovated?

laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights.

What is the difference between "more and more increasingly" and "increasingly"? This sentence appears to mean "Technological change has outstripped the law's ability to protect citizens' rights." You have used 26 words where 11 would do. That means this draft hasn't been edited by you at all.

One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.

Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Exigent circumstances can always exist, and courts may use the exception on a case-by-case analysis.

The more interesting discussion lies with the [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest][search incident to arrest doctrine]], and whether it applies to warrantless searches of data within a smart phone. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The court in United States v. Finley decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a physical container of evidence. Police had arrested Finley as part of a staged drug bust, and seized his phone during the arrest. When Finley was being questioned, the police looked through his phone and found incriminating text messages and call logs. The court did not recognize a distinction between a cell phone and a closed container, and therefore held that such searches of closed containers fall within the search incident to arrest exception. Since the phone was taken during a proper custodial arrest, the search of the phone was constitutionally valid. More recently, the court in People v. Diaz held that a cell phone seized during an arrest is an object immediately associated with a person, and thus it can be searched incident to arrest. The court determined that the key question was how to characterize the phone. Whether the phone is immediately associated with his person is crucial because “[i]f it was, then the delayed warrantless search was a valid search incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. If it was not, then the search, because it was remote in time and place from the arrest, cannot be justified as incident to that arrest unless an exigency existed.” As these cases illustrate, at least some courts have been willing to allow warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest.

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Technological change has outstripped the current law's ability to protect citizens' rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smartphone. I am using the term "smartphone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smartphone is confiscated. Under the existing law, the police can now search the phone and its digital content without a warrant. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before.
 
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However, when the object being searched is now technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change.
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An exception for a warrantless search is a search incident to arrest. Searches incident to arrest, however, are reasonable only for the purposes of removing dangerous items that threaten the arresting officer or preserving evidence. The Supreme Court has laid out the exception as applied to containers found on an individual in United States v. Robinson and United States v. Chadwick. In Robinson, the Court upheld a search of a cigarette packet found in the shirt pocket of an arrestee, saying that searches of containers at the time of arrest is valid. Later, the Chadwick Court narrows the container doctrine when it held that a locked footlocker found with the arrestee could not be searched without a warrant. The Court reasoned that the footlocker had a higher expectation of privacy and once the footlocker was in police control, there was no danger of officer harm or loss of evidence.
 
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The court in United States v. Finley decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a physical container of evidence. Police had arrested Finley as part of a staged drug bust, and seized his phone during the arrest. When Finley was being questioned, the police looked through his phone and found incriminating evidence. The court did not recognize a distinction between a cell phone and a closed container, and therefore held that such searches of closed containers fall within the search incident to arrest exception. More recently, the court in People v. Diaz held that a cell phone seized during an arrest is an object immediately associated with a person, and thus it can be searched incident to arrest.
 
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Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. Since the court applied the search incident to arrest doctrine and held that the search did not fall under the exception, it can be deduced that the contents of a laptop cannot be searched under the incident to arrest exception. Furthermore, in United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007), the court upheld a warrantless search of text messages on a cell phone taken incident to arrest, but added that "[i]f the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court's reaction may be different, because of the substantial invasion of privacy."
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Modern smartphones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities. However, there exists a disparate treatment of the two because courts haven't recognized the distinction between smartphones and simple cell phones. Warrantless searches of cell phones have been for the most part upheld. Cases involving warrantless searches of computers are rare, and the few cases that do speak on the issue seem to suggest that searches of computers without warrants would not fall under the incident to arrest exception.
 
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Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well, however, there exists a disparate treatment of the two in the law. Warrantless searches of cell phones have been for the most part upheld. Cases involving warrantless searches of computers are uncommon, possibly due to law enforcement thinking it is beyond their rights to search a computer. The few cases that do speak on the issue seem to suggest that searches of computers without warrants should not and would not fall under the incident to arrest exception.
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The court in State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), ruled that the search of a laptop contents found in the backpack of the arrestee was unconstitutional. Furthermore, in United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007), the court upheld a warrantless search of text messages on a cell phone taken incident to arrest, but added that "[i]f the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court's reaction may be different, because of the substantial invasion of privacy." The heightened expectation of privacy on a computer and smartphone garners a heightened privacy protection. When the exception was crafted, it made sense to temper the Fourth Amendment protection during arrests because it was a reasonable search. The smartphone breaks down that reasoning because unfettered access to a smartphone is access to essentially everything private in a person's life.
 After the aforementioned Diaz case was decided, California legislature unanimously passed a bill that would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone taken from a person under arrest. The bill would have effectively overruled the Diaz decision, and declare that searches of cell phones do not fall within the search incident to arrest exception. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/20/tech/mobile/california-phone-search-law/
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Unfortunately, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill saying, "The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ The validity of his statement can be debated, but what can't be debated is the result that the veto leaves us: in California, police can search cell phones taken from an arrestee without a warrant.
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Unfortunately, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill saying, "The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ Courts have always been a step behind technology. Legislature hasn't always gotten it correct either as seen in spectrum allocation when radio was invented and television emerged. However, the bill in this case was correct to protect the privacy rights of individuals. Jerry Brown seems to have been swayed by the generous donors to his election campaign, supporters who will be crucial for his re-election. The Diaz court gave him an out, and he gladly took it, along with the privacy rights of his citizens.
 
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There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase.
 
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Because it has not been edited, this draft is blowsy. It says half as much as can be put in the space. It interferes with its own progress the way you would be hampered if you filled your apartment with junk until you could barely walk the halls. Analytically, you never explain why the category "computer" is more important than the category "stuff you had in your pockets when you were arrested." You do not review the law of search incident to arrest very comprehensively, citing a single "closed-container" case as though that were the only point in the space, and as though a box and a briefcase are always the same, and printed papers are always the same as white powders. Your discussion of the California situation is limited in the end to the use of an editorial adverb. Whether Brown's veto is "fortunate" or "unfortunate" is probably less important than the stated rationale you punt on discussing, or the political and industrial context you could have summoned to enlighten the reader as to other reasons why he cast it.

I don't want to perform the first edit here. That prevents you from learning how to do it. Cut the existing material by 50% and put the analysis in that the junk currently forces you to leave out. The we'll be cooking with gas.

 

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SpencerWanFirstPaper 6 - 21 Jan 2012 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones in the 21st Century

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Are you saying that you're not trying to write about the state of the law 88 years from now, in the 22nd century? Or distinguishing the situation from the 20th century, when there were no smartphones anyway? How about just "Warrantless Searches of Smartphones"?
 -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011
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With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society, laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.
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With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society,

Is there a society we don't use everyday? Is technology innovated?

laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights.

What is the difference between "more and more increasingly" and "increasingly"? This sentence appears to mean "Technological change has outstripped the law's ability to protect citizens' rights." You have used 26 words where 11 would do. That means this draft hasn't been edited by you at all.

One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.

 Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Exigent circumstances can always exist, and courts may use the exception on a case-by-case analysis.
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 There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase.
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

# * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, SpencerWan

Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list

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Because it has not been edited, this draft is blowsy. It says half as much as can be put in the space. It interferes with its own progress the way you would be hampered if you filled your apartment with junk until you could barely walk the halls. Analytically, you never explain why the category "computer" is more important than the category "stuff you had in your pockets when you were arrested." You do not review the law of search incident to arrest very comprehensively, citing a single "closed-container" case as though that were the only point in the space, and as though a box and a briefcase are always the same, and printed papers are always the same as white powders. Your discussion of the California situation is limited in the end to the use of an editorial adverb. Whether Brown's veto is "fortunate" or "unfortunate" is probably less important than the stated rationale you punt on discussing, or the political and industrial context you could have summoned to enlighten the reader as to other reasons why he cast it.

I don't want to perform the first edit here. That prevents you from learning how to do it. Cut the existing material by 50% and put the analysis in that the junk currently forces you to leave out. The we'll be cooking with gas.

 

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SpencerWanFirstPaper 5 - 05 Dec 2011 - Main.SpencerWan
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Search and Seizure in the 21st Century

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Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones in the 21st Century

 
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A poor title, much too general for the actual discussion. Pick one that actually describes the essay it precedes.
 -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011

With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society, laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.

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Why? The law says personal property in the immediate vicinity of an arrestee can be searched to protect the safety of arresting officers and to prevent destruction of evidence. That includes searching a briefcase for weapons, for example, but not reading the documents contained. The only reason there's a problem is recent "adapting" done by courts that have allowed searches where well-settled Fourth Amendment principles would have required a warrant.

Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Applying this rule to smart phones should yield an obvious result. Even if a phone has an automated setting to delete some of its contents after a certain date, any of the data deleted would be available from the cell phone service provider through a warrant.

Total nonsense. Obviously, network operators do not have a copy of all the bits on a smartphone, and they never will. Equally obviously, no phone will destroy any internal data if it is powered off. Removing the battery from a seized cellphone is obvious procedure for both security maintenance and evidence preservation reasons.

The exigent circumstances exception should not apply to smart phones because once the police have the phone, there does not exist any "now or never" necessity to search the phone without a warrant. Yet, some courts have held the opposite by holding that certain cell phones will an automated delete function can eliminate evidence from the phone. This argument again fails because the likelihood that content on the phone will disappear completely from both the phone and the cell phone service provider is very marginal.

This is not sensible analysis. There are no exigent circumstances unless there are exigent circumstances. You can't argue that exigent circumstances will never exist; obviously there are times when instant access to data on a cellphone will be necessary to prevent imminent harm, and those cases will have to be adjudicated on the basis of the circumstances,

The more likely exception to be used by court to uphold warrantless searches of smart phones will be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest[search incident to arrest doctrine]]. Under the search incident to arrest

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Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Exigent circumstances can always exist, and courts may use the exception on a case-by-case analysis.

The more interesting discussion lies with the [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest][search incident to arrest doctrine]], and whether it applies to warrantless searches of data within a smart phone. Under the search incident to arrest

 doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The
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court in United States v. Finley

Link the case.
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court in United States v. Finley
 decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a
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physical container of evidence. Currently, most states have allowed police officers to search cell phones as if they were analogous to containers.

Show that work. Containers are searchable incident to arrest, as I have pointed out, only to a limited extent. That's the rule whether the container is a briefcase, a laptop, or a smaller computer. If you have cases in "most states" that say otherwise, show them.
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physical container of evidence. Police had arrested Finley as part of a staged drug bust, and seized his phone during the arrest. When Finley was being questioned, the police looked through his phone and found incriminating text messages and call logs. The court did not recognize a distinction between a cell phone and a closed container, and therefore held that such searches of closed containers fall within the search incident to arrest exception. Since the phone was taken during a proper custodial arrest, the search of the phone was constitutionally valid. More recently, the court in People v. Diaz held that a cell phone seized during an arrest is an object immediately associated with a person, and thus it can be searched incident to arrest. The court determined that the key question was how to characterize the phone. Whether the phone is immediately associated with his person is crucial because “[i]f it was, then the delayed warrantless search was a valid search incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. If it was not, then the search, because it was remote in time and place from the arrest, cannot be justified as incident to that arrest unless an exigency existed.” As these cases illustrate, at least some courts have been willing to allow warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest.
 However, when the object being searched is now technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change.
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Why are call records in ordinary phones somehow not subject to Fourth Amendment protection? No search incident to arrest should extend to accessing call records unless there is a basis in exigency for doing so.

Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington

Link decision.
 
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ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. This holding clearly supports the rule that a computer is subject to higher 4th Amendment protection than a cell phone.
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Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. Since the court applied the search incident to arrest doctrine and held that the search did not fall under the exception, it can be deduced that the contents of a laptop cannot be searched under the incident to arrest exception. Furthermore, in United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007), the court upheld a warrantless search of text messages on a cell phone taken incident to arrest, but added that "[i]f the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court's reaction may be different, because of the substantial invasion of privacy."
 
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No, it supports the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine that the laptop could be seized and secured, but not searched without a warrant. No surprise here.
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Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well, however, there exists a disparate treatment of the two in the law. Warrantless searches of cell phones have been for the most part upheld. Cases involving warrantless searches of computers are uncommon, possibly due to law enforcement thinking it is beyond their rights to search a computer. The few cases that do speak on the issue seem to suggest that searches of computers without warrants should not and would not fall under the incident to arrest exception.
 
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Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that smart phones should be afforded the same heightened protection from search of its contents as a computer would.
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After the aforementioned Diaz case was decided, California legislature unanimously passed a bill that would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone taken from a person under arrest. The bill would have effectively overruled the Diaz decision, and declare that searches of cell phones do not fall within the search incident to arrest exception. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/20/tech/mobile/california-phone-search-law/
 
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Show that there is "heightened protection," rather than a uniform Fourth Amendment principle more or less uniformly implemented.
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Unfortunately, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill saying, "The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ The validity of his statement can be debated, but what can't be debated is the result that the veto leaves us: in California, police can search cell phones taken from an arrestee without a warrant.
 There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase.
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I don't understand how you can write about this subject while ignoring the events of this year in California, which would seem to be the leading illustration of your theme. In February, the California Supreme Court decided in People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 101, that mobile phones (smart or dumb, from your point of view) can be searched without warrant incident to arrest. The Legislature responded in August with SB 914, which reversed the Court's decision. Governor Brown vetoed the bill, saying courts were better qualified than the Legislature to decide. Seems to me you must have failed in conducting the research on which this essay is supposedly built if this wasn't known to you. If it was known to you, you certainly failed in your effort to explain the situation to the reader by leaving it out.
 
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

SpencerWanFirstPaper 4 - 08 Nov 2011 - Main.EbenMoglen
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

PLEASE EDIT

 

Search and Seizure in the 21st Century

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A poor title, much too general for the actual discussion. Pick one that actually describes the essay it precedes.
 -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011

With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society, laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.

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Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Applying this rule to smart phones should yield an obvious result. Even if a phone has an automated setting to delete some of its contents after a certain date, any of the data deleted would be available from the cell phone service provider through a warrant. The exigent circumstances exception should not apply to smart phones because once the police have the phone, there does not exist any "now or never" necessity to search the phone without a warrant. Yet, some courts have held the opposite by holding that certain cell phones will an automated delete function can eliminate evidence from the phone. This argument again fails because the likelihood that content on the phone will disappear completely from both the phone and the cell phone service provider is very marginal.
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Why? The law says personal property in the immediate vicinity of an arrestee can be searched to protect the safety of arresting officers and to prevent destruction of evidence. That includes searching a briefcase for weapons, for example, but not reading the documents contained. The only reason there's a problem is recent "adapting" done by courts that have allowed searches where well-settled Fourth Amendment principles would have required a warrant.

Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Applying this rule to smart phones should yield an obvious result. Even if a phone has an automated setting to delete some of its contents after a certain date, any of the data deleted would be available from the cell phone service provider through a warrant.

Total nonsense. Obviously, network operators do not have a copy of all the bits on a smartphone, and they never will. Equally obviously, no phone will destroy any internal data if it is powered off. Removing the battery from a seized cellphone is obvious procedure for both security maintenance and evidence preservation reasons.

The exigent circumstances exception should not apply to smart phones because once the police have the phone, there does not exist any "now or never" necessity to search the phone without a warrant. Yet, some courts have held the opposite by holding that certain cell phones will an automated delete function can eliminate evidence from the phone. This argument again fails because the likelihood that content on the phone will disappear completely from both the phone and the cell phone service provider is very marginal.

This is not sensible analysis. There are no exigent circumstances unless there are exigent circumstances. You can't argue that exigent circumstances will never exist; obviously there are times when instant access to data on a cellphone will be necessary to prevent imminent harm, and those cases will have to be adjudicated on the basis of the circumstances,

The more likely exception to be used by court to uphold warrantless searches of smart phones will be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest[search incident to arrest doctrine]]. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The court in United States v. Finley

Link the case.

decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a physical container of evidence. Currently, most states have allowed police officers to search cell phones as if they were analogous to containers.

Show that work. Containers are searchable incident to arrest, as I have pointed out, only to a limited extent. That's the rule whether the container is a briefcase, a laptop, or a smaller computer. If you have cases in "most states" that say otherwise, show them.

However, when the object being searched is now technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change.

Why are call records in ordinary phones somehow not subject to Fourth Amendment protection? No search incident to arrest should extend to accessing call records unless there is a basis in exigency for doing so.

Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington

Link decision.

ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. This holding clearly supports the rule that a computer is subject to higher 4th Amendment protection than a cell phone.

No, it supports the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine that the laptop could be seized and secured, but not searched without a warrant. No surprise here.
 
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The more likely exception to be used by court to uphold warrantless searches of smart phones will be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest[search to incident doctrine]]. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The court in United States v. Finley decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a physical container of evidence. Currently, most states have allowed police officers to search cell phones as if they were analogous to containers. However, when the object being searched is now technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change.
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Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that smart phones should be afforded the same heightened protection from search of its contents as a computer would.
 
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Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. This holding clearly supports the rule that a computer is subject to higher 4th Amendment protection than a cell phone. Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that smart phones should be afforded the same heightened protection from search of its contents as a computer would.
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Show that there is "heightened protection," rather than a uniform Fourth Amendment principle more or less uniformly implemented.
 There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase.
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I don't understand how you can write about this subject while ignoring the events of this year in California, which would seem to be the leading illustration of your theme. In February, the California Supreme Court decided in People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 101, that mobile phones (smart or dumb, from your point of view) can be searched without warrant incident to arrest. The Legislature responded in August with SB 914, which reversed the Court's decision. Governor Brown vetoed the bill, saying courts were better qualified than the Legislature to decide. Seems to me you must have failed in conducting the research on which this essay is supposedly built if this wasn't known to you. If it was known to you, you certainly failed in your effort to explain the situation to the reader by leaving it out.
 
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper"

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Fourth Amendment Rights in the 21st Century

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Search and Seizure in the 21st Century

 -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011

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--

How does encryption affect search and seizure of computers or smartphones? Can the police require you to unlock your phones for the exigent circumstances warrantless search? If the analogy is to a physical container, don't the rules change if that container is locked?

-- AaronChan - 30 Oct 2011

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Fourth Amendment Rights in the 21st Century

-- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011

With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society, laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.

Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Applying this rule to smart phones should yield an obvious result. Even if a phone has an automated setting to delete some of its contents after a certain date, any of the data deleted would be available from the cell phone service provider through a warrant. The exigent circumstances exception should not apply to smart phones because once the police have the phone, there does not exist any "now or never" necessity to search the phone without a warrant. Yet, some courts have held the opposite by holding that certain cell phones will an automated delete function can eliminate evidence from the phone. This argument again fails because the likelihood that content on the phone will disappear completely from both the phone and the cell phone service provider is very marginal.

The more likely exception to be used by court to uphold warrantless searches of smart phones will be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest[search to incident doctrine]]. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The court in United States v. Finley decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a physical container of evidence. Currently, most states have allowed police officers to search cell phones as if they were analogous to containers. However, when the object being searched is now technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change.

Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. This holding clearly supports the rule that a computer is subject to higher 4th Amendment protection than a cell phone. Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that smart phones should be afforded the same heightened protection from search of its contents as a computer would.

There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase.


You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

# * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, SpencerWan

Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list


Revision 8r8 - 04 Sep 2012 - 22:02:18 - IanSullivan
Revision 7r7 - 13 Apr 2012 - 23:50:38 - SpencerWan
Revision 6r6 - 21 Jan 2012 - 16:11:56 - EbenMoglen
Revision 5r5 - 05 Dec 2011 - 07:00:09 - SpencerWan
Revision 4r4 - 08 Nov 2011 - 15:41:22 - EbenMoglen
Revision 3r3 - 03 Nov 2011 - 03:04:16 - SpencerWan
Revision 2r2 - 30 Oct 2011 - 15:43:24 - AaronChan
Revision 1r1 - 22 Oct 2011 - 06:14:08 - SpencerWan
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