-- BarakBacharach - 08 Mar 2020

Positive VS. Negative Rights: The Fatal Flaw of American Constitutional Law and Privacy

The American Constitution as an Outlier

Last semester, I had the privilege of studying abroad in Italy, and taking a comparative Constitutionalism class. The opportunity to study the American Constitution outside of the constraints of our perspective offered a particular insight into the formation of the American Constitution and its glaring drawbacks -- namely, that it was drafted largely before the formation of "positive rights."

In Europe, the study of Constitutional Rights can be broadly broken down into two eras -- the era of negative rights and the era of positive rights. The era of negative rights is strongly associated with the classical liberal era, and thus, negative rights reflect the largely libertarian leanings of those times. Negative rights are the rights to be largely free of state interference or coercion when doing certain activities, most famously in the United States, either speaking or exercising one's religion. Positive rights, on the other hand, reflect a more modern understanding of rights that began to evolve in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and reached their Constitutional peak following WWII. Positive rights are affirmative guarantees from the government that it will provide something, usually medicine or education. Following WWII, many European states drafted Constitutions that guaranteed these positive rights, including ephemeral provisions that guaranteed the right to "dignity," whatever that means. The EU itself in turn adopted many of these positive rights in its seminal founding document, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The Positive and Negative Rights Distinction in the Context of Privacy

The distinctions between American and European Constitutional approaches to information privacy are vast, not least because of the times they were drafted. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a 21st century document and can thus explicitly can make reference to protecting information privacy. Article 8 of the CFREU famously has a provision stating "1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her." However, looking at the strictly technological advantages of the CRFEU misses the larger context of the kinds of rights embodied in the CFREU as opposed to the American Constitution. Because the Constitution was drafted and has been amended solely using negative rights language,