Two Party Playlets and Risk Profiles

-- By AbielGarcia - 14 Apr 2010

I recently received an e-mail from a family member who was imprisoned in Colombia and needed an undisclosed amount of money to get out. A week later I received an email from Anthony Pallone warning me of people phishing and trying to pull what Leff calls a "Spanish Prisoner." Leff describes the Prisoner as "a form of bunco in which two monopolies are personified and then dramatized in a play in which they are the absolutely irreplaceable complements of each other for the production of a particular bundle of wealth." In his discussion of the Spanish Prisoner, Leff asserts that the uniting factor of most swindles is that they involve casting, altercasting, and outcasting and that the only essential changes are with regards to plots of the con and dramatis personae. Yet, when changing the story of the con, what is important to change when it comes to different marks? Should the story be more credible, the potential profits less or even more, or should it be drawn out or perhaps shortened temporally? By analyzing the risk profile of "the mark," the prisoner can hopefully grasp a better understanding of how to draw the mark in.

Risk Profiles

In a general, there are three main categories of players in risk behavior analysis. Players are either risk-averse, risk neutral, or risk-seekers. A risk-averse individual favors a more certain outcome with a lower profit than a less certain outcome with a higher profit. A risk neutral individual is indifferent as long as the expected profits are equal, whether on be riskier than the other. A risk-seeking individual will take the highest profit even if the chance of the profit succeeding is one percent. The risk profile of a con's intended target has a significant effect on what types of casting must be used for the con to be successful.

Leff's Con Using Risk Analysis

Using the risk behavior and applying it at every decision that the mark makes, one can discern what each type of person needs for them to play their appropriate role. In Leff's Greek Prisoner scenario, the mark's risk profile affects how he will react to the initial request for $150 and the rest of the decisions he makes. A risk-averse individual will begin by focusing on the probability. For this person, the credibility of the prisoner at this point has to be high, if the probability of the payout is to low, then he will disregard it, even if his profit is higher than any other option. On the other hand, a risk-seeking individual will be easier to hook because his thoughts will gravitate towards the high pay out of $300,000. Thus, the prisoner must realize that if he wants to hook a risk-averse individual, he must have more credibility at the outset of the con then when trying to hook a risk-seeking individual. The same principles apply when the mark is making the final decision of whether to send the $8,000. The risk-averse individual will need more credibility to ultimately make the decision, just as Dr. Tzourous wrote the second letter asking for more credibility, while the risk-seeking individual will not require as much pushing or persuading to give the money up. Thus, within the context of the con itself, the prisoner, by understanding what kind of behavior the mark exhibits, can get away with pulling the same con with less credibility, i.e. newspapers or documents, by pulling it on a risk-seeking individual.

The Con as a Whole

As the prisoner understands that the behavior characteristics of the mark affect every decision made within the con, if the mark, at the initial decision to even enter the game, has other investment opportunities, then the prisoner has to increase his credibility again from the original level. Leff concludes that the prisoner game is a bilateral monopoly game, although not a perfect one. But if the con is looked at as an investment, then the monopoly power of the prisoner is lessened, especially if the mark risk-averse. It begins to look like a monopoly on the part of the mark, who alone wields the power to continue the con. Not until the first response is made by the mark does the con become a bilateral monopoly problem. The con, in itself, is a very risky prospect for the mark, especially if he has other licit investments that are more certain. A risk-averse person would rather take 40 dollars than flip a coin to get 100, even though the expected payout of flipping the coin is higher. The prisoner must realize that he is not only trying to hook the mark within the con itself, i.e. getting the doctor to pay for additional expenses for leaving the country, but also trying to hook the mark in the greater context of investment opportunities. Again, the prisoner, by understanding the mark's risk profile, can manipulate the credibility of himself in order to make sure the initial hook brings in the mark.

What does this all mean?

What this all means, especially in the context of selling, is that understanding one's risk profile is vital to ensure that the mark will continue to fall for the con. Now, cons are done on a mass basis, with generic emails flooding servers hoping for a bite from a mark that fits the role. Having generic email invites only a self-selecting pool of risk-seeking individuals and misses on many types of other individuals. The initial communication to the mark is competing as an investment opportunity with other licit or illicit opportunities. The con man needs to tailor the credibility to the risk profile to be able to avail himself to more of an audience. Once the mark responds, the imperfect bilateral monopoly game can begin with the prisoner adjusting his credibility to the amount of money requested with each communication. Using risk behavior analysis, one can understand what to change in a con to land "the big fish."

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