Dudley and Morality

When reading the excerpt for today's class, and when I finished reading Regina v. Dudley and Stephens in Criminal Law for that matter, I kept thinking about the practicality of the result. Would the convictions really prevent or deter survival cannibalism? Wouldn't the next crew to find themselves in such dire circumstances do the exact same thing, throw any evidence overboard, and just not tell anyone about what they had to do to survive? If so, it appears that the practical result is simply an incentive to lie.

Then why prosecute survival cannibalism? We talked about it in class as sending a message to the community that survival cannibalism will not be tolerated - better for all to starve to death on the open sea. It seems to me to be the importance of criminalizing activity deemed to be immoral. But even the conclusion that the conduct is immoral isn't universally held in the community, however, as evidenced by the death threat issued to the mayor. Even Richard Parker's brother Daniel, hearing the news and traveling to Falmouth, "shook hands ritually with the three men in open court . . . publicly exonerat[ing]" them. Yet there are those who, with Sergeant Laverty, the mayor, the magistrates et al., believe that the killing was so morally reprehensible to warrant the convictions. Eben mentioned his personal experience with his father, and I'm sure our class would split (though my guess is it would do so quite unevenly) on whether or not what he did was justified.

So I'm wondering what you all think - what purpose does the moral stamp of disapproval serve, if not deterrence and prevention? What is the practical effect of moral punishment, if it is so warranted?

-- CarolineElkin - 14 Apr 2009

The only true "purpose" I see by placing a moral stamp of disapproval is to stigmatize the practice until it is disfavored in the public. As you mention Caroline, the only effects will be an incentive to lie, certainly not increased maritime safety. This ban appears to be one group imposing its abstract principles on society. This recognition forced me to question whether morality itself can justify criminalization.

Can a visceral, biological reaction (which I'm sure many people share) to cannibalism alone support a per se ban? Should we avoid the higher modes of thinking simply because of an instinctive feeling that eating people is "over the line?"

My "gut" reaction is no. I think that relying on such abstract principles will either lead to transcendental nonsense, or perhaps worse, provide a cover for animus legislation. Any other thoughts as to the effects/justifications of morals legislation?

-- KeithEdelman - 14 Apr 2009