The Normative Value of Autonomy in Property Law

-- By HuazhouYe - 13 Feb 2023

Outdataed Normative Value

The concept, idea or philosophy of autonomy underlies all property law. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states that "[i]n the strict legal sense, property is an aggregate of rights of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes, which includes not only ownership and possession, which are guaranteed and protected by the government." The right to exercise dominion over resources and the legal limitations against that right gave rise to the authoritative laws over properties.

I don't understand how this last sentence follows from the definition given. I don't think the proposition you're stating is faulty, but I don't understand the derivation.

This appears to be a conclusion somehow derived from what judges do, but we have as yet no idea how you know what you claim.

Case Analysis

In Pile v. Pedrick, the expectation of autonomy is given absolute reference in the court’s application of the automatic injunction rule, where if trespass occurs, then injunction is appropriate if the property owner wishes so. The defendants in this case made the mistake of encroaching the factory’s foundation wall onto Pile’s property below the surface by one and three-eighths inches, for 50 feet.

The court seems to neglect autonomy or deem it as unimportant when utilitarian concerns can be justly presented without legal conceptual justifications. In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, the court in presenting a utilitarians argument on airplanes inability to pay landowners everytime it fly over, dismissed autonomy as deserving retribution if violated, in complete contradiction to the holy status of autonomy esteemed in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes. Autonomy sacrifice for the general good.

In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the court embraces the lawmaking power though it’s not supposed to, and argues that extending conversion would be problematic, therefore due to concerns for disincentivizing investment in research due to potential exposure to liability, autonomy should not be considered. respect for dignity and autonomy manifests in and requires recognition of property rights, the court here sacrifices these values for immediate economic benefits.

In Midler v. Ford Motor Company, court argues that autonomy, personhood, and identity are the basis of the property protection, but the ultimate ruling is disconnected, as there’s no connection between the normative values of personhood/autonomy and the final ruling, imitations are still allowed without commercial purpose. The court imposes two utilitarian limitations that have no connection to autonomy on the recognition of property rights; ironically, the limitations of autonomy make it a workable doctrine.

Even more ironically, sometimes when it’s time to determine and balance autonomy between two parties, the court will just avoid the question and leave the issue convoluted. In Ploof v. Putnam, two theories for recovery were presented, trespass, which structures around property law’s autonomy; and negligence, which around tort law’s duty of care, the court just refused to answer the question as framed by the plaintiff and didn’t signal which theory Plaintiff's recovery is based on. Autonomy here is purposefully avoided by the court in order to render a just ruling.

When it comes to dead hand control, the court is highly skeptical as to the amount of leeway and deference that is afforded to property owners when they are dead, so the court uses autonomy as a way to argue that dead people don’t have autonomy. In Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co, the court does not say the value of autonomy cannot be morally applied to dead people, but engages in lawmaking as it invalidates provisions of the will in the name of public policy. The court here sacrifices the autonomy interest of people when making their wills to further public policy concerns.

When autonomy is strictly followed, ridiculous results occur. The court applied autonomy in its absolute sense in Pile v. Pedrick, where autonomy was given absolute value, the court deferred to the whims of the plaintiff, no matter how ridiculously unnecessary and wasteful the remedy is. While if the court took utilitarianism into consideration, such wasteful ruling could be avoided. Autonomy works differently when it is applied to states as supposed to citizens. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the state owned land intended for sale and the land was held in trust for the people of the state. The court correctly applied the normative value of autonomy. But in this case autonomy is actually sovereignty. Sovereignty recognizes supremacy and operates between political organizations, property is subordinate to/subject to the dictates of sovereignty and captures interaction between the sovereign state and the property owner and between property owners. The court here sacrificed property and autonomy rights of the company to preserve the sovereignty rights of the state. Autonomy is applied to the sovereign but not the individual actor.

You haven't explained anything about the case to which you are referring. Why is there no link?

This is a confusing summary of a case which is again not stated, not linked, not described.

Same problem.

What does this mean?

Conclusion

Courts can broaden/narrow the time frame of autonomy, expand/shorten the scope of autonomy, embrace/avoid the application of autonomy, construct which parties deserve more/less autonomy, and interpret autonomy in its absolute/meticulously limited sense. The variety of ways of interpreting and applying the normative value of autonomy leaves the court great room for policy making, and that seems like what the court is conducting. Autonomy as a concept, however, either is used as a scapegoat for utilitarian values or deeply unsatisfactory when applied in an absolutist sense.

This draft says things about cases, but there is no analysis to back the conclusions. "Autonomy," which appears to mean the owner's right to do what she wills with her property, is said to be treated by judges as less absolute than some theoretic definition (ungiven) would—while also leading to "ridiculous" outcomes—require.

The first route to improvement, then, is to read the cases, rather than gesture at them. That done, I expect the conclusion you are now merely asserting can be shown to follow. Courts, as you say, cannot and do not actually behave as though the owner's will were absolute: the essence of "property" as a common-law concept is its inherent compromise between protection of expectations and the necessity of "planning" on the ground. Why that should be treated, as the present drafts treats it, as a bug rather than a feature isn't yet clear, but presumably would also emerge from closer contact with actual decisions.