Why the right to terminate a pregnancy is so extensively disrespected when other rights are protected

By: Lauren Roemke

Many of our class discussions implicated questions about one’s right to live and the extent to which others may alter this right. Is it morally or legally permissible to take another’s life due to necessity, end one’s own life when conditions no longer make life worth living, or end another’s life as a form of punishment? Questions surrounding life and death invoke fervent responses because they are central to the human experience and involve a range of religious, philosophical, cultural, and biological understandings. Nowhere are questions surrounding life and death more heated than in the topic of abortion. Just this past fall, a gunman attacked a Planned Parenthood clinic, killing three people. The battle mostly operates, however, within state legislatures, which seek to restrict a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy through increased requirements for patients and clinics.

An Unfortunate Outcome

State attempts to chip away at a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy are unique; states do not similarly attack one’s right to freedom of speech or access to legal representation, for example. This is likely due to the fact that expressing one’s opinion or using taxpayer money for legal representation does not result in the extinguishment of life. Most people agree that life has an intrinsic, inviolable value, and believe that it is regrettable when life, once begun, ends prematurely (Dworkin, p.69). In the case of abortion, in order for a woman to exercise her right not to develop part of herself into a separate human being, then she unfortunately has to end the life of the fetus she carries within her (Tribe, p.114). Many abortion opponents argue that a fetus is a human life, or a person, beginning at the moment of conception, which raises the stakes of terminating a pregnancy. Opponents argue that the outcome of abortion, terminating a human life, clearly outweighs the mother’s right to decide what shall happen in and to her body, and that this calculus justifies the continued assault on women’s right to terminate a pregnancy.

Does the outcome outweigh the woman’s right?

However, even accepting the premise that a fetus is a human life does not necessarily result in the conclusion that women should not have the right to terminate a pregnancy. Indeed, there are instances where one is justified in taking another’s life, such as in self-defense. In her article, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson invites the reader to imagine a scenario in which he wakes up and finds himself attached to a famous unconscious violinist. The violinist has a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers found that the reader alone has the right blood type to help. They therefore kidnapped him and plugged the violinist’s circulatory system into his, so that his kidneys can be used to extract poisons from the violinist’s blood as well as his own - to unplug the violinist would kill him. Is it morally incumbent on the reader to accede to this situation? Most would respond “no;” it would be kind to aid the violinist, but one is not required to do so.

Opponents would argue that the violinist analogy is inapplicable to the abortion debate because the patient in the hypothetical did not volunteer for the operation that plugged the violinist into his kidneys. In the case of abortion, when a woman voluntarily engages in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will result in pregnancy, she volunteers, or consents, to having an unborn person use her body for food and shelter. The absurdity of this argument is illustrated by another hypothetical: if a woman opens a window to air a room, and a burglar climbs in, it would be unreasonable to say that she’s given him a right to the use of her house – she’s partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, knowing that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle (Thomson). In essence, just because a woman voluntarily engages in intercourse does not mean that she volunteers to an unborn person using her body for food and shelter. And similarly to the case of the violinist, although it may be kind to allow the life within her to continue, she is not obligated to. Therefore, even accepting the premise that human life begins at conception, an unborn person’s right to life is not necessarily stronger than the mother’s right to decide what happens in her body because she did not give the unborn person a right to use her body for food and shelter by voluntarily engaging in intercourse.

Conclusion

States continue to try to restrict a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy because, unlike cases involving freedom of speech or legal representation, they see a compelling, if not the most compelling, reason for doing so: to protect human life. Given that many of these opponents view human life as beginning at the moment of conception, it is at first understandable why they seek to prohibit abortion, even in the early stages of fetal development. However, as the above hypotheticals illustrate, even accepting the premise that human life begins at conception does not determine that women are obligated to remain pregnant. In Abortion, Tribe explains that ultimately, the picture must include both the interest of the fetus and the interest of the pregnant woman. Keeping in mind both of these interests, Casey drew the line at fetal viability in determining when it would and would not be appropriate for women to terminate a pregnancy. Will we continue to allow states to try to redraw this line in a way that eclipses the interest of the woman?

• Dworkin, Ronald (1993). Life’s Dominion. New York: Vintage Books.
• Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1971). “A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(1).
• Tribe, Laurence H. (1991). Abortion, The Clash of Absolutes. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.