Regulators of North Carolina

Project Description and Research Questions

Project Description

For my project, I intend to study anti-creditor movements during the pre-Revolutionary war period. More specifically, I plan to study the Regulator movement in North Carolina, identifying its causes, Regulator demands and responses to the movement.

Research Questions

Who were the Regulators? What were their grievances? How did this movement seek to address these grievances? What did the insurrection's ultimate failure demonstrate about the colony's economic, political and legal structure?

Introduction to the Regulation

The Regulation arose in the western counties of North Carolina during the spring of 1768. Composed primarily of middling farmers, the Regulators demanded a public accounting of the taxes paid and an end to the extortionate legal fees that local clerks and sheriffs charged. Regulator tactics varied. At first convening assemblies, the Regulators requested “settlement” with local officials to determine the amount of taxes collected and the proper court fees. Rebuffed, the Regulators intensified their agitation. After closing the Hillsborough Courthouse in September 1770 and refusing to pay further taxes, Governor Tryon threatened reprisal. The Regulators responded by petitioning the Governor and House of Representatives, seeking prosecution of local officials, and even electing sympathetic representatives to the Assembly in 1769. The Governor and his anti-Regulator supporters responded decisively. Upon rejecting their petitions, stymieing their prosecutions and ousting their representatives, violent conflict ensued. At the Battle of Alamance on May 16, 1771, Tryon routed the Regulators. Facing criminal prosecution for riot, Regulator leaders dispersed and the movement dissipated.

The Regulation represented a conflict over which classes would control the debt of the North Carolina Piedmont. Prior to the Regulation, small farmers issued credit to their neighbors. These farmer merchants rarely sued over debt, and instead charged higher prices for store goods to cover defaulting loans. By the late 1760s, commercial merchants had displaced farmer merchants as the primary backcountry creditors. Unlike the agrarian merchants, this new mercantile class aggressively pursued debt prosecutions. When these indebted farmers turned to the Hillsborough Courthouse, juries consisting of merchants and lawyers consistently found against them. The courthouse itself became a financial boon to these non-agrarian elites, who charged extortionate fees and distrained goods with impunity. This transformation in debt issuance and collection threatened the fabric of backcountry agricultural production. Piedmont farmers stood at risk of losing their farms, crops and livestock to a non-agrarian creditor class. When peaceful means of protest failed, they rebelled.

Who Were the Regulators?

Geography of the Regulation – A Western Insurrection Against Westerners

The Regulation enjoyed its greatest support in the western counties of North Carolina. Orange, Rowan and Anson counties were the epicenter of the Regulation, as evidenced by the volume of Regulator petitions and advertisements that originated in these counties. By contrast, not a single Regulator advertisement or petition issued from the coastal counties. Even among eastern Whigs, the Regulation found no support. To the contrary, Whig leaders such as James Iredell denounced the Regulation as “desperate diseases” warranting “desperate Remedies” (CRNC 270). So great was this coastal hostility to the Regulation that Whig leaders burned in effigy two writers for the Massachusetts Spy, who had written favorably about the Regulation (Kars, 209). Nor did the Regulators look upon coastal Whigs as potential allies. Rather, Regulators cautioned the Sons of Liberty to avoid carrying “on unjust Oppression in [their] own Province.” (CRNC, 249). Though not overtly hostile to these Whigs, the Regulators understood that eastern opposition to the Stamp Act did not translate to support for western debtors.

The earliest social history of the Regulation, by John Spencer Bassett, explained the Regulation as a sectional conflict rooted in the disparate economies of the Piedmont and coast. Large slave plantations dominated the eastern counties, argued Bassett, whereas an economically isolated western frontier practiced subsistence farming. Western farmers revolted against elite eastern planters who overtaxed them while depriving them market access and adequate political representation.

Despite its geographic concentration in the piedmont, the Regulator insurrection did not pit westerners against easterners, as Basset argued. Local clerks, lawyers, jurors and sheriffs earned the bulk of Regulator criticism. In the Tenth Regulator Advertisement, an assortment of Orange Country Regulators traced “all our grievances” to the “roguish practices of ignorant and unworthy men who have crept into Posts of Offices.” (CRNC 758-759). Regulator contempt crystallized around the person of Colonel Fanning, the leading political figure and assemblyman of Orange Country. So great was the contempt for Colonel Fanning that Herman Husband, a leading Regulator, devoted an entire tract to his abuses (Husband, A Fan for Fanning).

Criticisms of coastal planters and politicians were notably absent from most Regulator petitions, letters and advertisements. The one petition that references the “Maritime parts of the province” does so to condemn the planter elites of the western counties for not shouldering a fair share of the tax burden. (CRNC, 83) An October 1769 petition from Rowan county asked that the Assembly “pass an Act, to Tax every one in proportion to his Estates; however equitable the Law as it now stands, may appear to the Inhabitants of the Maritime parts of the province, where estates consist chiefly in Slaves; yet to us in the frontier, where very few are possessed of slaves, tho’ their Estates are in proportion (in many instances) as of one Thousand to one, for all to pay equal, is with Submission, very grievous and oppressive.” (CRNC, 83) These petitioners implicitly recognized that the taxes would seem fair to an eastern planter rich in slaves, who paid taxes on those slaves. Rather than castigate these eastern planters, the petitioners highlighted how these taxes worked an inequity among western farmers. The western land speculator paid the same amount of taxes as the subsistence farmer.

Though a sectional affair, the Regulation was a western rebellion against fellow westerners.

Wealth – An Uprising of the Middling Farmer

The Regulation drew the greatest concentration of supporters from middling farmers. While most tax lists from the Regulation did not survive, the 1779 tax list for Orange Country remains extant. This list shows that 3.6 percent of the wealthiest ten percent of Orange Country residents identified as Regulators, and only 23.2 percent of the poorest 30 percent so identified. By contrast, 37.5 percent of taxables in the 30th to 60th percentile signed Regulator petitions, and 35.7 percent of taxables from the 60th to 90th percentile. (Whittenberg, 220). Anti-Regulators, by contrast, controlled much of the wealth of the western counties. Extant tax lists indicate that wealthiest one percent of Orange County mostly consisted of known anti-Regulators. (Kay, The North Carolina Regulation, 82).

Though Regulator support correlated with wealth and income, this disparity did not itself trigger the Regulation. Not all anti-Regulators were rich, nor were all Regulators poor. Herman Husband owned an extensive estate in western North Carolina, and had even attempted land speculation in the backcountry. (Ekirch, 637). Wealth alone therefore did not excite the Regulators, who looked to Husband for leadership.

Nor did the Regulator’s invocation of wealth indicate hostility to the wealthy landowners, as historians such as Marvin Kay have argued. Kay’s portrait of the Regulation as an uprising of the poor against the rich hinges on the class consciousness of the poor, who in Kaye’s argument, conceived of themselves as a “class of poor farmers.” (Kay, The North Carolina Regulation, 108). Yet the evidence Kay cites is ambiguous at best. Petitions that describe the Regulators as “poor Industrious peasants” lend themselves to a multiplicity of readings. The word “poor” could refer to the peasants’ relative poverty, their suffering, or both. Nor is it apparent why this modifier deserves any privilege over the subject of the petition – the peasant. Contrary to Kaye’s argument, Regulators rarely referred to their adversaries by wealth alone. Regulators instead described their enemies by reference to their occupation.

Rather than cause the Regulation, wealth correlated with social class, which served as the catalyst for the uprising. Merchants and lawyers consolidated control over the backcountry debt in the late 1760s, appropriated taxes, land and chattel, and consequently enlarged their estates. It was the commercial merchant as creditor that threatened backcountry farmers – the merchants’ private gain represented a symptom of a much more invidious disease.

Occupation – A Farmer’s Rebellion

The Regulation was fundamentally an agrarian movement against commercial merchants and their lawyer allies. Of the Orange County residents whose political affiliations could be determined, all twelve merchants and all twelve lawyers opposed the Regulation (Kay, The North Carolina Regulation 82). Nor did any of the twelve sheriffs, clerks, registers or coroners side with the Regulators. Similar numbers prevailed in Rowan and Anson Counties. (Kay, The North Carolina Regulatio 82). That merchants, lawyers, sheriffs and clerks supported the anti-Regulators does not entail that most anti-Regulators belonged to these classes. Those who opposed the Regulation were mostly farmers. Nevertheless, leading anti-Regulators like Colonel Fanning did not work the land.

Regulators understood their movement as an insurrection against a non-agrarian elite. Rowan County Regulators petitioned the Assembly “to pass an Act to call in all the now acting Clerks, and to fill their places with Gentlemen of probity and Integrity” while also “prohibiting Judges, Lawyers and Sheriffs, from fingering any of their fees” before a final determination. (TC 376). The petition also requested “an Act to prevent and effectually restrain every lawyer and Clerk whatsoever from offering themselves as Candidates, at any future Election of Delegates, within this Province.” (TC, 375). Lack of “redress in what is called Courts of Justice,” Claimed Regulator Teague, derived from the substantial number of “Clarks & Sherrifs” who sat on the juries. (CRNC, 70). Regulators therefore defined themselves against a non-agrarian class. The forces arraigned against the Regulators were a legal and mercantile elite, they envisioned, whose avarice left farmer “properties… quite insecure.” (CRNC 233).

Just as the Regulators understood their movement as a defense of the planter class, likewise anti-Regulators understood the Regulation as an uprising against lawyers and merchants. Richard Henderson, a judge during the Hillsborough Riots, described how the Regulators deliberated targeted Hillsborough merchants. Regulators shattered only the merchants’ windows during the Hillsborough Riots. (CRNC, 244). A keeper of the Atkin Ferry described a mob of Regulators eager “to kill all the Clerks and Lawyers,” while denouncing an Assembly that “made just such Laws as the Lawyers wanted.” (TC, 623). And Colonel Fanning worried that Regulators would punish the local leaders, whom he identified as the “Clerks Sheriffs Registers Attornies and all Officers of every Degree and Station.” (TC, Fanning Letter 23 April 1768).

Occupation and ties to merchant creditors significantly influenced partisan affiliation. Not only the Regulators, but also their enemies, understood these differences to be the source of conflict.

Religion – A Dissenters' Rebellion

The Regulation thrived amidst religious dissent. The religious dissenters in the backcountry successfully “evaded the Vestry Act by electing the most rigid dissenters for Vestrymen who would not qualify.” (CRNC, 241). Tryon himself noted the near impossibility of inducting ministers in the backcountry, reporting the “cruel Treatment” ministers received from their Parishiners, particularly at the hands of the “Quakers and Annabaptists” (TC, 314). So strong was the religious dissenters’ support for the Regulation that Presbyterian Pastors felt compelled to chastise their members who swore the Regulator oath (CRNC, 315). Governor Tryon shared this perception that religious dissent fueled the Regulation, and encouraged the Assembly to pass an act authorizing Presbyterian ministers to solemnize marriages as a means of purchasing Presbyterian sympathy. Notably, Colonel Fanning introduced this act concurrently with a series of acts targeting Regulator grievances, including regulation of official fees. (CRNC, 323).

Religious dissidence supplied the content of Regulator demands and also shaped the form of Regulator protest. Thus the October 1769 petition from Rowan county asked for “A Repeal of the Act, prohibiting Dissenting Ministers from marrying according to the Decretals, Rites and Ceremonys, of their Respective Churches,” a request that appeared after the petition to dismiss all the Clerks. (TC, 376). Even redress of the more economic and legal grievances bore religious undertones. Over taxation would be resolved by producing lists of taxables for all to view. (CRNC 702). Not only could every farmer grasp the tax laws, but the act of revelation served as the appropriate remedy. Colonel Fanning captured this dynamic with the greatest clarity, disclaiming that the county “Leaders” would “be arraigned at the Bar of their Shallow Understanding” and “be punished and regulated at their Will, & in a Word for them to become the Sovereign Arbiters of Right & Wrong.” (TC, Fanning Letter April 23, 1768). Much as the unlearned could perceive right and wrong through the ‘inner light,’ so too could unlettered farmers correct legal and economic wrongs by subjecting tax records to public scrutiny.

Causes of the Regulation

Tax and Debt Collection

Extortionate tax and debt collection triggered the Regulation. Sheriffs who collected taxes for the sinking fund kept a substantial portion of what they collected. The Regulators consistently demanded an accounting of the public taxes to determine how much had been collected, and to what purposes the money had been applied (CRNC 732). Governor Tryon privately acknowledged the merits of the Regulators’ complaints, reporting in private correspondences that “the Sheriffs have embezzled more than one half of the Public Money ordered to be raised and collected by them” (TC, 531). Tryon’s successor, Governor Martin, concurred. Martin claimed that sheriffs collected “Double, Treble, nay even Quadruple the value of the Tax” (CRNC 763). Although neither the Regulators nor the Provincial leadership suggested that this embezzlement was a new phenomenon, the practice may have proved particularly onerous during the Regulation, due to the escalating tax burden. The sinking fund had increased significantly in the late 1760s because of the French and Indian War and the expenses incurred in building the Governor’s mansion. (Kay, “Payment of Provincial and Local Taxes in North Carolina, 226-227).

Much as local officials used tax collection for private profit, so too did these officials deploy debt collection as a means of personal aggrandizement. Clerks and attorneys overcharged for court fees. Colonel Fanning, for example, charged twice the normal court fees for a wealthy widow. (CRNC, 69). Regulator petitions and advertisements frequently objected to court officers who collected fees that exceeded the legally prescribed amount. (CRNC 733). Sheriffs also collected twice for the same debts (CRNC 775), collected amounts that exceeded the value of outstanding debts (CRNC 776), and distrained goods and chattel to pay debts for which no writs could be located (CRNC 777). Governor Martin acknowledged these practices, declaring the “demands of Court officers for Fees… exorbitant, oppressive and extra-legal (CRNC 762). Echoing Regulator complaints, Martin condemned Sheriffs for collecting up to “Quadruple the value of the… debt” (CRNC 763). Even Governor Tryon refused to defend the local officials. In response to a Regulator petition, Tryon recommended that the Regulators find redress within “the Laws of the Country” (CRNC 793), even going so far as to instruct his attorney general to prosecute any officer guilty of extortion (CRNC 794). Extortionate debt collection posed such a problem that the House suggested reforming the laws governing fee collection, because the “exactions of officers” seemed “penal” (CRNC 322). At the time it issued this proposal, anti-Regulators represented the backcountry, with Colonel Fanning himself representing Orange Country. Extortion therefore represented an uncontested fact in the backcountry.

Control Over Backcountry Debt

Extortionate debt collection drove the Regulators to insurrection more for its symbolic value than for its practical consequences. After all, the Regulation found its greatest support among farmers of middling means. Nor did Regulator petitions claim that the Regulators could not afford taxes and court fees. Rather, it was the extra-legal quality of these taxes and fees that animated the Regulators. Extortionate fees and debt collection incited violence because of what it represented – a contest between farmers and commercial merchants over who would control the thin network of debt that fueled the backcountry economy.

Population growth in the late 1760s attracted commercial merchants to the North Carolina Piedmont, who in turn supplied an increasing quantity of credit to backcountry farmers. By dominating the courthouse, the Hillsborough merchants and lawyers determined the course of det litigatio. The Regulators’ struggle to sue county clerks for overcharging court fees illustrates how merchant creditors had captured the courthouse. Even when the Regulators successfully made out a writ against a court clerk, the jury threw out the case “on the old score No Bill.” (CRNC 70). Commercial merchants therefore owned an increasingly share of the debt while also consolidating control over the mechanism of debt collection.

In the absence of commercial merchants, fellow farmers extended credit to one another, which constrained their ability to sue on debts. Scattered throughout the countryside, local taverns and stores supplied farmers with credit in the 1750s. Frequently, farmers operated these smaller outfits out of their farms (Thorp, 390). And while these farmer-merchants purchased goods from locales as distant as Charleston, neighboring farmers provided the bulk of supplies (Thorp, 399). A litigious farmer-merchant would therefore threaten his suppliers, who were also his friends and family members. These farmer merchants therefore eschewed the time, expense and ill will of the courthouse, and instead paid for defaulting debts by marking up the prices of store goods. (Thorp, 407). Even with only 31 percent of accounts paid in full, a tavernkeeper could maintain a successful enterprise. (Thorp, 406).

As the backcountry population exploded in the 1760s, merchant firms displaced these farmer merchants, thereby weakening the restraints on debt litigation. In the years immediately preceding the Regulation, the number of merchant firms increased from eight in 1762, to eighteen by 1765. (Whittenberg, 224). Debt litigation spiked during this period. From 1753 to 1762, 681 suits were initiated in Orange County. (Whittenberg, 232) For the three year period between 1763 and 1765, 841 suits were brought before the Orange Country courthouse (Whittenberg, 232). The composition of litigants also changed during this period. Lawyers and merchants brought suit in only one-tenth of cases between 1753 and 1762. (Whittenberg, 232) From 1763 to 1765, this figure had risen to a third. (Whittenberg, 232). Unlike farmer merchants, these commercial merchants did not supply their stores primarily with the local goods, nor did the owners engage in agricultural production. The social and economic ties that disciplined farmer merchants exercised no power over the growing merchant class. These merchants therefore readily availed themselves of the courthouse and sued to collect debts that had previously gone unpaid.

That animus towards merchants fueled the Regulation is demonstrated not only in petitions and Regulator destruction of merchant property, but also by the failure of the Regulation to gain a foothold in territories free of merchant firms. The Moravian religious community, for example, opened a store at Bethabara in 1759. (Kars, 61) Bishop Spangenberg articulated strict rules for the store’s operation, even providing a formula for calculating the price of imported goods. (Thorp, 403). Moravian patronage ensured the store’s success, even as merchant firms crowded the backcountry in the early 1760s. Shielded by their religious institutions, the vortex of merchant debt did not reach the Moravians. Consequently, the Moravians remained neutral during the Regulation. (Kars, 121).

Regulator Demands

Regulators sought to replace courthouse personnel, limit legal fees and expose tax lists to public scrutiny. They demanded that acting clerks be replaced with “Gentlemen of probity and Integrity,” to place clerks on salaries, and to investigate the state of the sinking fund. (TR, 375-378). These measures were designed to eliminate the courthouse as a source of profit, and to ensure that farmer’s representatives would hear debt claims. This desire to discipline merchant creditors included bypassing the courthouse altogether for small claims. Regulator petitions therefore called for a single magistrate to hear claims of up to six pounds. (TR, 377). Such a law would place most farmer debts outside the reach of the courthouse clique. Notably absent from these petitions is any call for land reform, or any complaint that the legal fees or taxes were too high. Regulators did not conceive of their movement as an uprising against the rich. Their demands instead sought to restrain commercial merchants as a creditor class that employed the courthouse as a device for aggressive debt collection.

Conclusion

The Regulation represented an insurrection of western farmers against an increasingly powerful class of commercial merchants and lawyers. By the early 1760s, these merchants had displaced small farmers as the source of credit in the backcountry. Constraints on farmer creditors had no effect on the new commercial creditors. Unlike farmer creditors, these commercial merchants did not obtain supplies from local producers, nor did they supply credit to neighbors and family. The commercialization of credit therefore left Piedmont farmers without the means to discipline the creditor class. Commercial merchants’ seizure of the courthouse foreclosed the possibility of legal redress. Farmers therefore turned to petitions, elections, and eventually armed resistance to recapture the courthouse and check the commercial merchant’s political and economic ascendancy. At the Battle of Alamance in 1771, this movement met a crushing defeat.

Citing References

• CRNC - Saunders, The Colonial Records of North Carolina
• TR - Powell, The Correspondences of William Tryon and Other Selected Papers

All primary source documents referenced above appear under "Primary Source Documents," which are listed chronologically below.

Primary Source Documents

Assorted Documents

• Letter_Describing_Religious_Dissenters,_20_July_1766.pdf: Letter describing the religious dissenters in the North Carolina backcountry.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_August_1766.pdf: Regulator Advertisement from Orange County.

• Governor_Tryons_A_View_of_the_Polity.pdf: Governor Tryon's description of the political, legal and economic structure of the economy.

• Governor_Tryons_Letter,_4_July_1767.pdf: Governor Tryon describes the embezzlement of taxes.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_15_Jan_1768.pdf: A Regulator advertisement.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_4_April_1768.pdf: A Regulator advertisement.

• Letter_from_Edmund_Fanning_to_Governor_Tryon,_23_April_1768.pdf: Letter from Edmund Fanning to Governor Tryon, detailing the objects of Regulator hostility.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_25_April_1768.pdf: A Regulator advertisement.

• Letter_to_Governor_Tryon,_28_April_1768.pdf: Letter from Samuel Spencer, county clerk and assembly member. Spencer describes the Regulators' refusal to pay taxes, and their desire to inspect the court records.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_30_April_1768.pdf: Regulator Advertisement, with instructions for the Regulator Convention attendees.

• Regulator_Advertisement,_Petition_and_Letter.pdf: Regulator advertisement, petition and letter to Hermon Husband.

• Letter_from_William_Tryon,_16_June_1768.pdf: Letter from Governor Tryon to the Earl of Hillsborough, describing the Regulator demands.

• Tryons_Response_to_Regulator_Petitions,_13_August_1768.pdf: Tryon's response to the Regulator petitions. These documents also includes some exchanges between Tryon and the Regulators while Tryon was in Hillsborough.

• Exchange_between_Anson_County_Regulators_and_Governor_Tryon,_15_Aug_1768.pdf: Exchange between Anson Country Regulators and Governor Tryon. In response to the Regulator accusations of extortion, Tryon recommends that they prosecute the offending officials.

• Article_from_Boston_Chronicle,_7_Nov_1768.pdf: Article printed in the Boston Chronicle, reporting on the poll taxes levied to pay for Governor Tryon's house.

• Petition_and_Depositions_from_Orange_County.pdf: Petition from Orange Country residents and accompanying depositions, describing the extortionate practices of Orange County court officials.

• Governor_Tryons_Letter,_20_March_1769.pdf: Governor Tryon describes religious dissenters in the backcountry.

• Fanning_Trial,_22_March_1769.pdf: Trial of Colonel Fanning for extortion.

• Letter_to_Herman_Husband,_14_Sept_1769.pdf: Letter to Herman Husband, detailing the difficulties that some backcountry farmers experienced in suing for extortion at the local courthouse.

• Regulator_Petitions,_October_1769.pdf: Several Regulator petitions, demanding that: lawyers be barred from the House of Representatives; clerks receive salaries rather than fees; dissenting ministers be allowed to marry their followers; taxation proportional to estates; and several other items.

• House_Recommendations,_31_Oct_1769.pdf: Recommendations from the House of Representatives concerning record keeping for the public funds.

• Assembly_Resolutions,_06_Nov_1769.pdf: Assembly resolutions discussing the collection of public funds, and subsequent address by Governor Tryon.

• Tax_Collection,_Rowan_County_1770.pdf: Sheriff describes Regulators' refusal to pay taxes in Rowan County

• Orange_County_Petitions.pdf: Petitions from Orange County

• Letter_to_Governor_Tryon,_13_March_1770.pdf: Letter to Governor Tryon explaining describing the religious dissenters' obstruction of a Vestry vote.

• Hillsborough_Riots_24_Sept._1770.pdf: An account of the Hillsborough Riots, which took place on September 4, 1770.

• Tryons_Response_to_the_Hillsborough_Riots.pdf: The Attorney General describes the incident as a riot - which does not amount to treason - and consequently recommends that the Assembly pass a Riot Act

• Anti-Regulator_Petition.pdf: An anti-Regulator petition, signed by Edmond Fanning.

• Minutes_from_the_Assembly,_17_Dec_1770.pdf: Minutes from the Assembly following the Regulator insurrection. The Assembly addresses fraudulent land conveyances, official fees, the expansion of inferior courts, and empowering Presbyterian ministers to solemnize marriages.

• Petition_from_Orange_Country.pdf: Petition to empower justices of the peace to hear small claims.

• Johnston_Riot_Act.pdf: The Johnston Riot Act, enacted on January 15, 1771.

• Letter_from_James_Iredell,_21_Dec_1770.pdf: Letter from James Iredell describing the Johnston Riot Act.

• Deposition_of_a_Backcountry_Resident,_8_March_1771.pdf: Deposition of a backcountryt resident, describing the Regulator reaction to the Johnston Riot Act.

• Tax_Collection_in_Bute_County,_23_April_1771.pdf: A sheriff describing his difficulty in collecting taxes.

• Letter_from_Governor_Martin,_30_Aug_1772.pdf: Letter from Governor Martin describing his tour through the Western counties, and assessing the causes of insurrection.

• Letter_from_Governor_Martin,_16_March_1775.pdf: Letter from Governor Martin assessing political sympathies on the eve of the Revolution.

Herman Husband's "An Impartial Relation"

• An_Impartial_Relation,_First_Part.pdf: Herman Husband's "An Impartial Relation," printed in 1770. This document contains pages 1-25.

• An_Impartial_Relation,_Second_Part.pdf: Herman Husband's "An Impartial Relation," printed in 1770. This document contains pages 26-50.

• An_Impartial_Relation,_Third_Part.pdf: Herman Husband's "An Impartial Relation," printed in 1770. This document contains pages 51-75.

• An_Impartial_Relation,_Fourth_Part.pdf: Herman Husband's "An Impartial Relation," printed in 1770. This document contains pages 76-104, the final page in the tract.

Herman Husband's "A Fan for Fanning"

• A_Fan_for_Fanning,_First_Part.pdf: The first part of Herman Husband's "A Fan for Fanning."

• A_Fan_for_Fanning,_Second_Part.pdf: The second part of Herman Husband's "A Fan for Fanning."

• A_Fan_for_Fanning,_Third_Part.pdf: The third part of Herman Husband's "A Fan for Fanning."

• A_Fan_for_Fanning,_Fourth_Part.pdf: The fourth part of Herman Husband's "A Fan for Fanning."

Secondary Sources

Ekirch, A. Roger. "A New Government of Liberty": Hermon Husband's Vision of Backcountry North Carolina. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 34, no. 4 (Oct. 1977), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2936186 (accessed October 22, 2009).

Hoffman, Ronald. 1976. The "Disaffected" in the Revolutionary South. In The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young, 273-316. DeKalb? : Northern Illinois University Press.

Jameson, J. Franklin. 1926. The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kars, Marjoleine. 2002. Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Kay, Marvin L. Michael. 1976. The North Carolina Regulation, 1766-1776: A Class Conflict. In The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young, 71-123. DeKalb? : Northern Illinois University Press.

Kay, Marvin L. Michael. The Payment of Provincial and Local Taxes in North Carolina, 1748-1771. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 26, no. 2 (April 1969), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1918676 (accessed October 22, 2009).

Kulikoff, Allan. 1993. The American Revolution, Capitalism, and the Formation of the Yeoman Classes. In Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young, 80-119. DeKalb? : Northern Illinois University Press.

Thorp, Daniel B. Doing Business in the Backcountry: Retail Trade in Colonial Rowan County, North Carolina. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 48, no. 3 (July 1991), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938142 (accessed October 22, 2009).

Whittenburg, James P. Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers: Social Change and the Origins of the North Carolina Regulation. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 34, no. 2 (April 1977), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1925314 (accessed October 22, 2009).

-- ChrisFasano - 22 Dec 2009

• This is a relatively self-contained mini-thesis, the sort of work that would make a fine undergraduate history thesis, or a good run of exercise for a graduate student. I think the judgments offered are a little captious. It may seem easy to dismiss, for example, what you apparently regard as stereotypical Marxisé analysis by Marvin Kay, though it's fine of the form, but to say that you're not writing about class warfare because it is only the war of debtors against creditors and not the war of the poor against the rich strikes me as faintly absurd.

• But I think the real problem for me is that this is not a project from which the reader can learn how historical questions are answered. Your mode of construction is so evidently to read the secondary sources, find and scan the sources the secondaries cite, and then rewrite those sources into a new narrative that tries to ascribe excellence or error to the secondaries from which you began. Precisely because this mode depends on the writers of the secondaries having exhaustively plumbed primary sources in order to write up their broad-gauge narratives, the real methods by which history is done are fundamentally concealed among the trees upstream. Perhaps actually asking a legal history question would have helped. For example: Who was criminally prosecuted as a result of these events, what were the charges brought, and how were they tried?

• Thanks for the feedback. I was wondering how I should fix the problem related to the primary sources. After reading through the secondary sources, it appears that the Colonial Records of North Carolina and the Correspondences of William Tryon are the only available sources outside of archives physically located in North Carolina. Within these two collections, I scanned and posted whichever documents related to the Regulation, and then organized them chronologically. If I answer the question that you posed using the available primary sources, would it still suffer the same defect related to the primary sources? Also, is it worthwhile to retain the analysis that I've already posted? I agree that the Regulation was about class warfare, but one of farmer-debtors vs. merchant creditors (rather than rich vs. poor, which is Kay's argument - although I can now see that my analysis is unclear on this point).